Path: utzoo!attcan!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!apple!oliveb!ames!xanth!nic.MR.NET!umn-cs!bungia!orbit!pnet51!philo From: philo@pnet51.cts.com (Scott Burke) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Adaptive vs. intelligent (was Re: "Intelligence") Message-ID: <871@orbit.UUCP> Date: 14 Jun 89 13:45:47 GMT Sender: root@orbit.UUCP Organization: People-Net [pnet51], Minneapolis, MN. Lines: 60 >>I ask whether the system of evolution, that is, >>the origin of species by variation and natural selection, is >>intelligent. I claim that there is a sense in which it is. > > Evolution may be intelligent, by some definitions of > the term. But, it is not a lifeform, it is not embodied > within a living thing, 'it' is a process larger than all of us. Must intelligence be embodied in a "lifeform"? This objection seems aimed strictly at denying us applying the term to any but organic systems which display intelligence. Why is it any more valid to apply the term to an organic system, than to an inorganic one, or one composed of discrete organic entities? There is no real reason, other than that it provides an artificial cutoff for political purpose. In Douglas Hofstadter's book, there is mention of a gedanken which exposes this particular bias: Suppose that we have the capability to duplicate the structure and exact function of individual neurons with a mechanical/silicon device, and we go about replacing the neurons in a man's brain one by one. At what point does it cease to possess the necessary qualities for thinking? (Or in this case "intelligence") It would seem logical to conclude that the system of devices would be every bit as "intelligent" as the original "brain" which was in the lifeform -- and if the silicon replaced brain could be extracted from the organism, it would function as an independently intelligent non-lifeform. Denying a system -- any system -- the description of "intelligent" on the basis of its form (organic, discrete organic units, or silicon) has little or no logical* basis. Without knowing what it is ABOUT ORGANIC LIFEFORMS that makes there "mind behavior" intelligent, it is senseless to presume that those qualities are not inherent in other systems simply because we are not accustomed to ascribing the trait to them (ie. evolution). What this objection ultimately reduces to is saying that a machine can't be intelligent "by virtue of it being a machine", and not because it doesn't display the requisite characteristics. It is the requisite characteristics which matter -- not the form. > The changes due to evolution may only be called > "adaptation" since the plasticity of such changes > is over generations, not within one lifetime. > I would limit "intelligence" in living things to those Again, the question arises, is it a logical necessity that intelligence perform according to some arbitrary specification (ie. "as fast as humans can") in order for it to be intelligence? If we were to slow a man's brain down such that it's neurons interacted at half their normal speed (but in all other respects functioned the same), would there be any reason to deny that he was still thinking/intelligent? What if you halved that speed again? And again? At what point does he cease to be intelligent? In short, the function of the system is still the same; if we are to deny intelligence on the basis of non-functional criterion, we must show some logical necessity between the criterion and the function (intelligence/thinking). Perhaps there is a logically necessary reason why the functional quality intelligence is displayed by systems having the specific characteristics of being lifeforms, or being "as fast as lifeforms", but if there is, it is not obvious. It is a part of the question of AI and philosophy/psychology to determine the real answers to these questions, rather than simply declaring them to be self evident truths and be done with it. UUCP: {amdahl!bungia, uunet!rosevax, chinet, killer}!orbit!pnet51!philo ARPA: crash!orbit!pnet51!philo@nosc.mil INET: philo@pnet51.cts.com