Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!att!cbnews!military From: gardiner@umn-cs.cs.umn.edu (David Gardiner) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: Dogfighting Message-ID: <7394@cbnews.ATT.COM> Date: 13 Jun 89 03:23:26 GMT References: <7363@cbnews.ATT.COM> Sender: military@cbnews.ATT.COM Organization: CSci Dept., University of Minnesota, Mpls. Lines: 65 Approved: military@att.att.com From: "David Gardiner" While dogfighting should not be a fighter pilot's objective, there are many cases where it is virtually inevitable. Stealth and long range missile technology is great if you are fighting WWIII and can safely assume that all unidentified aircraft are hostile. The real situation that our pilots have to deal with (and probably will continue having to deal with for the foreseeable future) is more fuzzy. Recent examples include our forces off of Iran and Libya. With the Libyan MiG-23s, the F-14s were essentially forced into a dogfighting situation because they could not fire until there was overwhelming evidence that the MiGs were hostile. In Vietnam, due to a couple cases of friendly aircraft being shot down by our long range AA missiles, Congress decreed that no shots could be fired until the target aircraft had been identified visually. With 2000+ kt closure rates, if you can see the other aircraft well enough to identify it, you are in a dogfight. The obvious example of the dangers of beyond visual range weapons in non-all-out war situations is the downing of the Iranian airliner. Early versions of the F-4 were developed on the missile platform theory. That is, most of the enemy would be destroyed with long range missiles (Sparrows) and the few that sneaked through would be dispatched with short range missiles (Sidewinders). Guns were unnecessary as dogfights were a thing of the past. Since the aircraft needed only to be a missile platform, maneuverability was not important. Unfortunately, the Sparrows were horribly unreliable. The requirement of visual identification forced the F-4s into dogfights, for which they were at a great disadvantage. Later versions of the F-4 were improved to make them adequate dogfighters The F-14 was designed to incorporate many of the lessons learned from Vietnam. It was designed for ACM performance (though they did skimp a bit on the engines) and included a gun. The primary lesson that had been learned was that ACM CAPABILITY IS ESSENTIAL REGARDLESS OF THE AVAILABLE WEAPON TECHNOLOGY! Note also that the F-14 includes a high power television camera that allows the crew to identify fighter sized aircraft at ranges of fifty miles or so (a partial solution to the requirement for identification prior to firing). According to the book _Top Gun_, a part of the class teaches students how to deal with aircraft that may or may not be hostile. The primary lesson is to maintain a position so that, if the situation turns into a dogfight, you have the advantage. Aircraft maneuvering technology seems to be heading away from high G turns to other forms of maneuverability, such as piroette turns (stand the plane on it's tail and spin). At least one of the new X planes is designed to research this (the X-31, I believe). The X-29 is testing high angle of attack but I do not know the details. A note regarding stealth fighters. One of the uses of fighters in non-all-out war situations is to warn nasties to keep away. We WANT Kadaffi to know that there are F-14s protecting our ships. Everything that I have read seems to agree with my conclusion that the primary use for Stealth aircraft is for attack. The moral of the story seems to be the same one that was learned from the F-4. Most of the missions that fighter aircraft are used for require dogfighting capability. David Gardiner