Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!att!cbnews!military From: howard@cos.com (Howard C. Berkowitz) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: urban combat Summary: Urban guerillas normally threaten own Message-ID: <7556@cbnews.ATT.COM> Date: 17 Jun 89 04:46:03 GMT References: <7476@cbnews.ATT.COM> Sender: military@cbnews.ATT.COM Organization: Corporation for Open Systems, McLean, VA Lines: 86 Approved: military@att.att.com From: howard@cos.com (Howard C. Berkowitz) Let me preface certain of my remarks with a the comment that they are intended to stay within the sci.military charter of dealing with military technology (including tactics). Especially when dealing with guerillas in the early -- i.e., Mao/Giap stages I and to some extent II -- phases, it is virtually impossible to separate political and psychological tactics of guerillas fromt their combat tactics. The same basic tactics emerge, in general, at either end of the guerilla ideological spectrum. [mod.note: The topic is certainly borderline; but in this article, as in the previous one, the presentation is excellent. I can tolerate straying a bit from the charter, so long as the posting doesn't draw flames; and I doubt this one will. - Bill ] Briefly, my background in this includes graduate study in national security policy (read that unconventional warfare and intelligence), work as a writer and research assistant at the Army-funded Center for Both the above were at The American University in Washington. Research in Social Systems (formerly Special Operations Research Office). and engineering devices for low-intensity combat during the late 60s and early 70s, coupled with continued reading in the field and parties with the current practitioners! > From: Jerry Harper > Anyone interested, historically, in the formation of guerilla units to combat > regular forces should read "Guerilla days in Ireland" by Tom Barry. The author > was the leader of an IRA guerilla group colloquially termed a "flying column" > due to the rapid mobility over vey rough terrain. Barry's group was probably > the most successful of all the guerilla groups in acting against the British > forces, and the book documents not merely the type of weapons they improvised/ This sounds rather interesting, as guerilla groups (defined as early in a guerilla conflict, as opposed to the later stages where guerilla units take on more characteristics of regular combatants). The term "partisan" is reserved by some writers (and used more casually by others) to refer to such mobile units, which can trace their antecedents to 19th century irregular cavalry units operating behind enemy lines. There is a collection of essays, unfortunately in storage at the moment, which I believe is titled _Readings in Guerilla Warfare_, which has an extensive article on a Spanish unit in such cavalry operations (Peninsular War?). Soviet units in early WWII also occasionally had such a "traditional" partisan role, as opposed to the more common guerilla tactic of ambush, disperse, and reform, as opposed to the partisan style of patrol, strike, and run like hell AS A UNIT. ). Finally, the > current successors to the Old IRA legacy, the Provisional IRA, also > publish a series of manuals on the conduct of guerilla warfare. However, these > are illegal publications here, possession of which usually entails a four year > prison sentence. Hopefully, anyone coming in contact with such materials > will have the good sense not to circulate them. I don't know if the criminality of such materials is for specific titles, or for the general subject. I am rather amused, however, to note that if "left-wing" guerilla texts are forbidden, something like the Cypriot offering, "Grivas on Guerilla Warfare," is a thorough text from a very right-wing viewpoint of politics. > > Just as a personal aside, which Bill may choose to excise if he wishes, I think > readers of the group who may be considering adopting a fantasy concerning the > excitment and nobility of urban combat would do well to reflect on the threat > which many guerilla groups pose to the population they alledgedly represent. > I second this comment. Again and again in guerillas' own handbooks, there is a point emphasized that it is to the insurgents' ADVANTAGE to have the central authority strike at the general population; such actions are perceived as repression and can assist in gaining sympathy for the insurgents, perceived as opponents of the government. When looking at a terrorist incident in the news, it is often informative to ask the question: while I may be horrified by this, could this act make solid strategic sense to the guerilla, because it triggered expected government roundups (for example) of people on the political fringe but not KNOWN to be guerilla supporters, or triggered some other form of counteraction which could gain support for the guerillas? Of course, in many cases today, terror is a nihilistic action of a few crazies without a strategic plan. It's worth knowing the difference. -- howard@cos.com OR {uunet, decuac, sun!sundc, hadron, hqda-ai}!cos!howard (703) 883-2812 [W] (703) 998-5017 [H] DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the Corporation for Open Systems, its members, or any standards body.