Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!mcvax!ukc!etive!epistemi!edai!cam From: cam@edai.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm cam@uk.ac.ed.edai 031 667 1011 x2550) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Free will and responsibility. Keywords: Behaviorism, materialism, dogma, science Message-ID: <443@edai.ed.ac.uk> Date: 23 Jun 89 19:56:25 GMT References: <10333@ihlpb.ATT.COM> <3850@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu> <52019@linus.UUCP> <533@orawest.UUCP> <2586@rice-chex.ai.mit.edu> <386@edai.ed.ac.uk> <149@unix.SRI.COM> <421@edai.ed.ac.uk> <2095@ucsfcca.ucsf.edu> <234@unix.SRI.COM> Reply-To: cam@edai (Chris Malcolm) Organization: University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh Lines: 39 In article <234@unix.SRI.COM> ellis@chips2.sri.com.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes: > QM is quantum mechanics. > > Without QM, one could still assert that things are *really* deterministic, > however it is not humanly possible to perform the computations or acquire > knowledge of all the variables. This is to say, metaphysically we would be > deterministic, but there would be overwhelming epistemic problems in making > any prediction. Ah. A subtle point. "Hey Bert! D'you think the cognitive police are onto us?" "Metaphysically speaking we are liable to arrest and imprisonment, but the cognitive police suffer from such overwhelming epistemic problems that we needn't worry." But all this came up in the context of (ahem) free will, the suggestion being that since free will is incompatible with determinism, then only if human behaviour can be shown to be undetermined can free will, responsibility, rational choice, civilisation as we know it, etc., be saved. I know that to lots of people free will is so _obviously_ incompatible with determinism that it need not even be argued. My problem is that I don't see any incompatibility, and I've never seen a good argument for it. I see no problem in having free will even without QM, chaos, or any other indeterministic insect in the clockwork of a completely (metaphysically) predictable Universe. I see even less problem in having free will in a Universe which simply _seems_ to be completely determined. I honestly don't know what all the fuss is about. I find the suggestion that my freedom of will depends upon some kind of random die in my head rather insultingly trivialising of the freedom of will. Don't we lock up unpredictable people in prisons and nuthouses? -- Chris Malcolm cam@uk.ac.ed.edai 031 667 1011 x2550 Department of Artificial Intelligence, Edinburgh University 5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK