Path: utzoo!attcan!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!aramis.rutgers.edu!athos.rutgers.edu!nanotech From: djo@pacbell.com (Dan'l DanehyOakes) Newsgroups: sci.nanotech Subject: What, me worry? Message-ID: Date: 28 Jun 89 20:17:31 GMT Sender: nanotech@athos.rutgers.edu Organization: Pacific * Bell, San Ramon, CA Lines: 173 Approved: nanotech@aramis.rutgers.edu This is getting *way* out of hand. Part of the problem is that we're simply talking about two different things. Alan is concerned with military gragu; I'm more worried (for now) about the randomly created voracious molecule. Since a lot of this dialog is based on that noncommunication, I'm dropping a *lot* of points from this message (and there was much rejoicing). >What about first proving that "gray goo" is possible? But first, what IS >gray goo, precisely? Simply: an uncontrollably self-replicating nanodevice or group of nanodevices. >There are indications that gray goo may not pose much of a threat simply >because it is impossible--or at least only possible if "gray goo" is given >a very "watered down" definition. I don't regard my definition as watered down; and I'd say it allows for the possibility of real goo: using Drexler's everpresent analogy to biostuff, the existence of uncontrollably self-replicating things like bacteria and viruses is proof of the possibility of goo. >What is an AIA? An "artificially intelligent assembler" I assume? Have you >read Engines Of Creation yet? Yes, I have. And, for all the validity of its ideas, it remains a patchwork of guesses and speculation. By "AIA" I mean a nanodevice or system of nanodevices capable of replicating other objects, whether by program (directed assembly) or by analysis (disassembly) and synthesis (self-directed assembly). Pretty much by definition, such a device would be capable of self-replication. >An assembler will be roughly the same size as a ribosome. An example of what I call guesses and speculation. Until you've built the damn thing -- or at least made a plausible design for it -- you really don't know how big it will be. And, no, I don't regard KED's "design-ahead" speculations on the assembler anything like plausible; he makes assumption after assumption to come up with a size he's happy/comfortable with. We just plain *DO*NOT*KNOW* what's involved in building a doohickey of such flexibility. We've never done it on the macro scale. Nor do such general assemblers exist in nature; ribosomes are *very* limited in what they can build -- they build essentially- linear objects (chains of amino acids) from an extremely small "alphabet" of components. Even if you allow that the assembler is working solely with atoms and not groups of atoms (such as amino acids), there are more kinds of atoms than there are types of amino acids used by ribosomes...and atoms with the same valence will be difficult for an assembler to tell apart by the "purely chemical" means so dear to KED. >It simply cannot be possible to store enough information in >such a small space (around 10**6 atoms) to have an artificially intelligent >device Right; even if each atom carried a full information bit, there would be on the order of one Mbyte total. Small. But I don't buy that assemblers are *necessarily* that small. And the AIA is the integrated system, not a single nanodevice. >I suspect that what you really mean by "AIA" is "a system of assemblers and >nanocomputers running expert-system software for molecular mechanics." Possibly. >But given nanotechnology, what environment will humans >be able to survive in? And active shields? And what about gray-goo counter- >measures which temporarily "kill" biologic life--but not beyond the ability >of nanomachines to perform "resurrections?" To the first, who should I know? I imagine it'll be environments with food and oxygen and a reasonable temperature range. If nanodevices change that, I'll be surprised; more likely they'll bring an environment with them. >Then rest your mind. This is precisely the period when the greatest care will >be taken, if the recent history of biotechnology is any guide. And the early >years will also coincide with the time when nanomachines will be the most >dependent of special enviroments for their survival. This situation will >be quite deliberate, and probably forced on us by the laws of nature. The first point fails to convince me; I think you're underestimating human stupidity. The second is somewhat more comforting. >Software is another matter...but that may be a moot point also in light of the >fact that neural nets are not programmed--just taught. ...maybe... >Have you ever experimented with the game of "Life?" Yes. >If the gray goo devices >are programmed to blindly eat everything that they encouter, then they are >very likely to quickly eat themselves and/or their energy supply--long bofore >they have "finished" their job. Possible. What's finish? Will they wipe themselves before they cripple what they've begun destroying? If it eats my legs and the bottom two feet of my house and car (and wife and kids!) I don't really care about it wiping itself out at that point. >It's also a completely normal human tendency to demand safeguards up the >ying-yang when a new and dangerous technology is being tried out. Just ask >Jeremy Rifkin. Please don't mention that name. I just ate. Yeh, it *does* seem possible. Here, where protestors can shut down a lab or force it to take all reasonable precautions and some not. But what about a place (the USSR, for example) where lab work is not only not to be interrupted by the people's unreasonble demands for "safety," but in fact not even known to the public? >Nothing is 100% safe. There are dangers in avoiding nanotechnology, which may >in the end be even more formidable than gray goo. The question is, "What course >provides the least risk over all?" Agreed; and I think avoiding nanotech is more dangerous than pursuing it. (Always assuming it can "really" be done at all.) >>>And we need to find out how to reliably >>>cure and prevent the sort of "insanity" (or "antisocial behavior") which >>>drives (or permits) people to purposely seek to harm others. <---------- | >>Again -- whose definition? | | >Do you want to argue over definitions or do you want to prevent gray goo? | | I want to protect human beings. And I think your scenario above ----------- violates people's right to mental privacy, among other things. >Remember, nanotechnology promises indefinite life spans. Yeah? I've hear promises before. Again I say "prove it." >>That's culturocentric. Samurai, for example, often performed anti-survival >>acts. Ditto car bombers. Are they insane? > >Those aren't even good examples. Of course they are/were insane. The degree >to which you give people the benefit of the doubt is a function of what risks >you are willing to take. Which do you fear most? The car bombers, ovbviously. But neither can I call them "insane," and I repeat that calling them insane is culturocentric. They're sane, in both cases, by the standard of their own societies. >>Because goo only has to attack one thing. Sheilds have to attack any >>hypothetical goo. > >Pish and tosh. You have it backwards, my friend. Absolutely right. I confused myself. (I'm frequently groggy when doing this news stuff.) That should have read: "Because goo doesn't have to be selective about what it attacks. Sheilds have to attack any hypothetical goo and *only* goo." (Though goo *can* be selective about what it attacks. Imagine stuff that attacks only the vitreous fluids of human eyes... Yuccch...) >But the burden of proof is on you: gray goo has never existed before, as >far as we know. ...but neither has human-made nanotech. If you allow biolife as proof that nanotech is workable, than you have to accept highly successful bacteria as proof that grey goo is workable... Roach