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From: peter@ficc.uu.net (Peter da Silva)
Newsgroups: comp.unix.questions,comp.unix.wizards
Subject: Re: at files and permissions
Message-ID: <4925@ficc.uu.net>
Date: 10 Jul 89 13:06:52 GMT
References: <9583@alice.UUCP>
Organization: Xenix Support, FICC
Lines: 18

I thought at(1) needed root permissions so it could run scripts under
each user's own id. If there's some other way that at(1) could run a
program setuid to an arbitrary user than by being root (or by invoking
another program setuid to root) I'd be mighty interested.

Unless you want to radically change the semantics of at(1), at scripts
are basically setuid shell scripts. Given the effort at(1) goes to to
retain the rest of the invoking user's environment, I don't see that
this is desirable.

One thing that at(1) needs to do, at least on SVR3, is to save the ulimit
somewhere that it can be used while uid is still root. It's possible for
a user's ulimit to be bigger than cron(1)'s.
-- 
Peter da Silva, Xenix Support, Ferranti International Controls Corporation.
Business: peter@ficc.uu.net, +1 713 274 5180. | "try out a seldom-used feature
Personal: peter@sugar.hackercorp.com.   `-_-' |  of C -- the ``comment''."
Quote: Have you hugged your wolf today?  'U`  |   -- David Gelhar.