Path: utzoo!utgpu!watmath!att!dptg!ulysses!andante!princeton!njin!rutgers!att!cbnews!military
From: military\@att.att.com (Bill Thacker)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: The death of mobile war
Message-ID: <8804@cbnews.ATT.COM>
Date: 4 Aug 89 13:06:35 GMT
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From: military\@att.att.com (Bill Thacker)




bnr-di!borynec@watmath.waterloo.edu (James Borynec) writes:
>
>I believe that we are about to have a revolution in conventional
>warfare.  [...]
>
>This mustering of combat power requires the movement of men and machines.
>Unfortunately, bullets and rockets can concentrate much faster than   
>men and their machines.[...]
>
>Modern artillery doctrine covers the battlefield with observers.  And,
>any one observer can, if the target is worthwhile, have every gun 
>within range fire at that target.  When you talk about guns and rockets 
>with 30 to 40 km ranges, that can be a very large number of guns
>indeed. [...]
>
>Since the guns are distributed over a radius of 30 kms, it is hard to
>strike at them, and it may be quite difficult to locate the joker with
>the radio who is making life so difficult for them.
>
>The result of all of this, is that you can concentrate immense and 
>effective firepower faster than the enemy can concentrate his men and
>machines.  


Certainly, the advent of improved conventional munitions for artillery
will make a difference in warfare.  However, I feel your argument overlooks
several important issues.

You mention the defender's ability to bring to bear "an entire corp's
artillery" on a moment's notice.   However, this corp is strung out
along, (heck, what is the prescribed frontage for a modern corp ?);
well, along quite some distance.   And while the attacker will no doubt
be highly concentrated at the schwerepunkt (literally, "heavy point" of
the assault), a requirement for this sort of mobile warfare is a holding
attack along other points of the front.  At the attack point, the one
defending corp's front will likely face 2 or three attacking corps.

This secondary holding attack is necessary to specifically prevent what
your forsee; a redeployment of enemy resources to meet your spearhead.
The holding attack confuses the enemy during the critical early stages of
the battle; arty HQ, for example, becomes quickly flooded with demands
for fire missions, from the corp's entire front.  It takes time, much more
than the 2-3 minutes needed to actually direct the fire, simply to sort
out which targets get priority.

The holding attack likewise prevents movement of troops, either in
withdrawal or to other parts of the front.

Further, the attacker, too, is concentrated, as I said; probably two or
three corps facing the lone defender.  That means two or three times
the assets, including artillery.  The attacker could, for instance, commit
half his artillery to counterbattery fire against the defending arty,
keeping the rest for other fire missions.  Other assets, such as air power,
will likewise be in the attacker's favor.  Finally, we must consider
tactical surprise.

IMHO, tactical surprise is the biggest reason to question the viability
of mobile warfare.  In WWII, when surprise was achieved, victory was greatly
facilitated.  If it was lost, things became unpleasant for the attacker.
As an example of the latter, consider Kursk.   Given that modern troops 
of all nations are fully motorized (which, in WWII, could only be said for
the Western Allies after the American entry), their tactical mobility is
quite high; with a reasonable warning (gained from, for example, satellite
reconnaissance), it should be simple to redeploy reserves to meet an
enemy thrust.   This one, however, is too close to call...  heck, we can't
even be sure the recon satellites will still be there in the event of a
war.

Your article reminds me of many I've read predicting the demise of the
tank on the modern battlefield.  They've been written since 1919, and
haven't yet been shown correct.  I think you've overlooked many factors
in combat (and, for that matter, so have I !);  the point being that
warfare is complicated and confusing, and very, very rarely is it
possible to reduce it to so basic an equation as you present.


-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Bill Thacker      moderator, sci.military      military@att.att.com
		      (614) 860-5294
"War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life
or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be 
thoroughly studied."   -  Sun Tzu