Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!aramis.rutgers.edu!athos.rutgers.edu!christian From: nlt@macbeth.cs.duke.edu (N. L. Tinkham) Newsgroups: soc.religion.christian Subject: Re: David Hume and the Fish Message-ID: Date: 4 Aug 89 03:45:54 GMT Sender: hedrick@athos.rutgers.edu Organization: Duke University CS Dept.; Durham, NC Lines: 65 Approved: christian@aramis.rutgers.edu Ranjan Samuel Muttiah asks: > What were David Hume's arguments against miracles and the age of the > Bible ? The strongest of Hume's arguments in section X ("of miracles") in _An_Inquiry_Concerning_Human_Understanding_ is as follows: 1) "A wise man...proportions his belief to the evidence." When attempting to discern the truth of some proposed statement of fact, one must base belief on the evidence of the senses. Such evidence is not infallible; one will accept or reject the truth of statements with a certain probability, that probability being based on the amount of evidence supporting the statement as contrasted with the amount refuting it. ( As a note, while this is a plausible description of the role of experimental evidence in verifying scientific theories, it is not the only such description; Karl Popper's model, for instance, comes to mind as an alternative. ) 2) The use of human testimony in support of belief should follow similar guidelines: our expectation of a given person's testimony being true should be based on our past experience of testimony and truth occurring together under similar conditions in the past. "Evidence" here would include evidence of the truthfulness of human testimony in general and of this person's reliability in particular, the degree to which the event being testified to is in accordance with other evidence we have about the world, and so on. 3) "A miracle is [by definition] a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined." That is, since a "law of nature" is the name we give to events that always (or almost always), in human experience, occur together, if we define "miracle" to be a conjunction of events contrary to such a pattern, then *by definition* there is very powerful evidence against any miracle. ( I can think of alternative ways to define "miracle", but Hume's is indeed one that I hear frequently, including in Christian circles, so he is not attacking a straw man. ) Therefore, 4) "If the falsehood of [a witness' testimony] would be more miraculous than the event which he relates, then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion." The obvious implication is that Hume is not holding his breath awaiting such a flawless witness. To summarize, since belief should be held in proportion to evidence, and since miracles are by definition events which occur contrary to overwhelming evidence of past events, justified belief in a miracle based on human testimony would require that that testimony meet an impossibly high standard of reliablity. Hume does not here argue that miracles are impossible, merely that I have insufficient reason to believe others' testimony of them. It is worth noting, for instance, that if we ask "but suppose that a miracle *did* occur, and I didn't see it, and someone told me about it?", if I follow Hume's advice, I will make the error of disbelieving the report. Even so, given that certain religions (mine, for instance) relies heavily on testimony of witnesses to miracles, the argument raises points worth considering. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- "If you've done six impossible things this morning, Nancy Tinkham why not round it off with breakfast at Milliways, nlt@lear.cs.duke.edu the Restaurant at the end of the Universe?" rutgers!mcnc!duke!nlt