Path: utzoo!utgpu!attcan!uunet!ginosko!ctrsol!sdsu!usc!polyslo!decwrl!amdcad!military
From: budden@manta.nosc.mil (Rex Buddenberg)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: The death of mobile war
Message-ID: <26730@amdcad.AMD.COM>
Date: 12 Aug 89 07:37:04 GMT
References: <8033@cbnews.ATT.COM>
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From: budden@manta.nosc.mil (Rex Buddenberg)

James,  You may be right that the tactical defensive may be on
the rise.  If our broader assumptions about the next war remain
unchanged.  That is, if we have a general conventional war, it
appears likely that the defensive may be in the ascendancy.
At sea, the analog is that the Soviets would find accomplishment
of a sea denial mission to be easier than we would find
a successful sea control mission.  We've always recognized
that it takes far more maritime power to control than deny.

But, back to the unstated assumption.  It appears that our foreseeable
future may include a lot of local wars rather than a global
unlimited (eve in non-nuclear) one.  The Persian Gulf is perhaps
an archetype of a low intensity conflict; our drug interdiction
work along the southern US border is a cognate example of a high intensity
law enforcement mission -- there is some convergence here...

In both cases, on scene units do not act either as lone units
(the traditional Coast Guard mode) or as tight battle groups with
interlocking firepower (traditional Navy mode).  Rather, each unit
is fairly autonomous regarding defensive firepower... but you
need interlocking C3I in order to get the wide area, multi-unit
synergism.

The impacts on force structure are interesting, and a bit in evidence,
although the driving strategy isn't always understood well.
The marines, as usual, seem to have the doctrine and force
structure planning down about as well as anyone.  They changed the
term Marine Amphibious Unit to Marine Expeditionary Unit a couple
years ago -- amphibious doctrine is still alive and well, but it
now fits into a larger limited intensity conflict structure
as an integral component.  The Marines are right now getting
their 20 year procurement strategy out the door along with the
tactical doctrine that drives it.  I'm rather impressed.

The Navy hasn't done as impressive a job, but the reactions to
the Stark and Roberts incidents is seeing improvements to ships'
local area self defense capabilities.  We're also seeing improvements
in the C3I structure -- including some long overdue impetus to
get some interoperability.  Recall that the AWACS over Saudi Arabia
watched the whole Stark incident happen -- impotent to do anything
about it because they lacked rapid communications with Stark.

I'm sad to state that the Coast Guard's planning approach is somewhat
slower than either of the other sea services.  (Since I'm a planning
officer these days, I'm allowed to say that).  But we are trying to
drive some interoperability between different mission areas within
the service -- rather toward similar objectives.  Perhaps, without
any capital investment money to carry them out, going though the
planning process seems rather pointless....alas.  

Yes, the tactical defensive in a hot war may be formidable, but
is the question relevant?

Rex Buddenberg