Path: utzoo!attcan!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!csd4.csd.uwm.edu!bionet!agate!ucbvax!hoptoad!gnu From: gnu@hoptoad.uucp (John Gilmore) Newsgroups: news.software.b Subject: Re: "Lines:" Message-ID: <8452@hoptoad.uucp> Date: 6 Sep 89 09:48:23 GMT References: <5200@looking.on.ca> <1989Aug30.052459.1166@vicom.com> <1989Sep5.145752.16320@mcmi.uucp> Organization: Grasshopper Group in San Francisco Lines: 34 It's trivial for each site to recompute the Lines: value if it wants it. NNTP servers can compute it for their clients, either when they store the message, or when the client asks for it. If a news reading program doesn't want to read way out to the end of a 60K message before displaying the first screenful, fine -- it can read a few hundred lines and report the message as "long" rather than give an exact count. I mean, jeez! There is no point in transmitting it around the countryside. My uucp summary for August shows that hoptoad received more than 170 megabytes and sent almost 300 megs, spending almost thirteen full days (319 hours) on the phone. Thank you Telebit! but I wouldn't object to cutting out 1% of that by dumping Lines: headers! I fully agree with Geoff and Henry that "Lines:" is one of the bogus headers that is polluting the Precious Bodily Fluids of our network. (One way that we disagree is that I think wasting bytes on uselessly long message-ID's is also a problem; they don't.) On the other hand, a good cryptographically secure hash function to provide a checksum of messages would be quite useful. Usenet has been dropping and mangling messages for too many years now; we can do better with minimal effort. I envison the checksum being in the message-ID so that if you see a reference to a message-ID and later obtain the message, you are guaranteed that you actually got a true copy of the message in question. (A cryptographically secure hash function is one where it is quite hard to change the message and predict what result that will have on the hash value. For example, changing the meaning of the message while leaving the hash the same is hard in a cryptographically secure hash function. It's not hard at all with things like CRC's.) -- John Gilmore {sun,pacbell,uunet,pyramid}!hoptoad!gnu gnu@toad.com "Watch me change my world..." -- Liquid Theatre