Path: utzoo!attcan!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!csd4.csd.uwm.edu!bionet!ames!amdcad!military From: unido!athen!sinix!es@uunet.UU.NET (Dr. Sanio) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: The death of mobile war Keywords: Kursk Message-ID: <27132@amdcad.AMD.COM> Date: 6 Sep 89 10:51:10 GMT Sender: cdr@amdcad.AMD.COM Organization: Siemens AG, K D ST SP4, Munich Lines: 118 Approved: military@amdcad.amd.com From: unido!athen!sinix!es@uunet.UU.NET (Dr. Sanio) [I'm posting this because it provides another view of Kursk, although its a bit inflammatory. I urge people to correspond directly rather than submitting to the list, unless they have something significant and new to add. --CDR] In article <27048@amdcad.AMD.COM> m1b@rayssd.RAY.COM (M. Joseph Barone) writes: > This is a common misconception of the Battle of Kursk. This >"strong defense in depth" strategy ultimately proved tactically wrong >but other political and strategic factors came into play to vindicate >it. It should also be noted that the Soviets had rather accurate >information on the Germans intentions, thanks, in no small part, to >the Lucy spy ring. (lot of stuff about battles in the North and Middle of Kursk front bow deleted) > Though the German losses were heavy, the Soviet losses were >much worse. Unfortunately for the Germans, the Allies had landed in >Sicily and Hitler was vasillating on continuing the offensive. He >finally decided to withdraw and even pulled the 1st SS Panzer division >and sent it to Italy. Operation "Zitadelle" was over. > > Despite the Soviets' elaborate preparations, with their >heavy concentration of artillery, the Germans managed (though not >easily) to dislodge the defenders. J. Barone's opinion fits perfectly in a certain kind of historiography I experienced in Germany when I was young (maybe accidentially). Then, German WWII veterans as well as historians tried to prove that they almost won the war, especially on the Eastern front. IMHO, they simply couldn't stand that they were beaten by the 'inferior race'. Might it be the same thing with Joseph & the bloody Commies :-) ? Well, let's remember what was intended by both sides in the summer of 43. The front had stabilized in the south & the middle part of the eastern front after the battle of Stalingrad and the subsequent Soviet offensives. The mud period in spring had stopped major actions on both sides. The heavy defeats and losses forced the Nazis to change their strategical goals. They couldn't hope any more to conquer Russia and they had to face major actions by the Western allies in the near future, which were considered as utterly hazardous by most military leaders (not only Hitler) due to the experiences of WWI. Therefore, the goal of Zitadelle was to defeat major Soviet forces and to win territories which allowed long-term-defense with less forces in order to establish a "fortress Europe". In short, Zitadelle was an attempt to win back initiative in the East and to stabilize Nazi rule in the conquerred territories. The Soviet's goals were just the contrary: preventing any stabilization of the German military position, keeping the initiative and after all that, causing as much losses as possible to the enemy with a minimum of own losses. I don't know anything about the Lucy spy ring, but I consider reconnaissance as just one part of the military balance of power and believe that it's often overestimated. Spy tales are romantic and give the chance to blame bad traitors (not the good military leaders) for a defeat. Anyway, the Soviets were better informed, also by partisan activities behind the enemy lines. And, pls note that during the whole war, the allies (not only the Soviets) had armies of spies-by-conviction available, even in Germany itself. This resulted out of the destructive nature of Nazi rule itself, who, on the other hand, were mainly left to buy the service of traitors. [Knowing your opponent's intentions is a tremendous advantage. I'm unfamiliar with the details of the Lucy spy ring so I don't know how much that affected things. --CDR] Back to the front. The Nazis started with very strong forces and hoped to win back Blitzkrieg mobility. Though they even won air superiority (at least temporarily, as I remember), they failed. They won some territory, but didn't succeed in uniting the northern and the middle wing of the attack. Instead, the biggest tank battle of military history so far (were ther a bigger since then?) took place near the village of Prochorovka in the middle of the front. The Soviets held the battlefield and slowed down the attack so that the idea of cutting a 100 miles hole into the Soviet front proved impossible. Though the Soviets suffered heavier losses than they presumably expected, organization and command structures of the involved units kept intact. Under tactical considerations, the Soviet approach was the more modern one. The Nazis tried to repeat 1939 (or 1941) and failed. Though the Russian deeply structured defence was not overall successful, it proved operable and lots of military leaders have studied it since then. Under the strategical aspect, the operation was a disaster for the Nazis. They had to give up all the territory won very soon without preventing further offensives of the enemy (see the following events of this year). As their resources were more limited (staff & eqipment), the heavy losses beat them much harder. No forces were freed to face the menace in the West, instead they had to stuff one hole by opening another. I don't know how far the Italian operation influenced the decision for withdrawal. But this decision makes only sense because the whole operation was a failure or at least highly questionable to succeed. One thing at the end: It's boring always to hear that "Hitler decided ..." when anything went wrong, whereas the ingenious German military leaders won in case of success. I read this in the memoirs of lots of German WWII generals and consider it an utterly cowardish and irresponsible attitude. I'm convinced that this war was not only a huge crime (which is not subject of sci.military [That's right, it's not! --CDR]), but starting it with the expectation to win it was irrealistic and illusionary from the beginning on. Contradictory decisions - by Hitler as well as by other political and military leaders of Germany - were simply a consequence of that, responsible and realistic ones had never begun the war. [My own feeling is that control from the rear by politicians does lead to failed military actions, because the commander needs to understand the situation, and that requires up to the moment knowledge of the local terrain, forces, etc. -- CDR] best regards, es