Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!cwjcc!gatech!amdcad!military From: military@cbnews.ATT.COM (William B. Thacker) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: Kursk Keywords: Zukov Message-ID: <27302@amdcad.AMD.COM> Date: 17 Sep 89 10:05:24 GMT References: <27272@amdcad.AMD.COM> Sender: cdr@amdcad.AMD.COM Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories Lines: 101 Approved: military@amdcad.amd.com From: military@cbnews.ATT.COM (William B. Thacker) In article <27272@amdcad.AMD.COM>, Carl Rigney comments: > > [ While the Soviets are notorious for slanting their history, I > thought the following account of Kursk from Zukov's book was > worth posting to provide a balance. --CDR] I've read Zhukov. Aside from overt political infighting, he's relatively factual. > Panzer divisions include Greater Germany, Adolf Hitler, Death's >Head, the Reich (I believe these were the elite SS divisions). Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, Das Reich, and Totenkopf were 1st, 2nd, and 3rd SS Panzer divisions, respectively. Together, they formed the SS Panzerkorps. Grossdeustchland was a normal Wehrmacht division, albeit larger and better equipped than the rest. GD had significant propoganda value; most German divisions were of local origin (e.g., 2nd Panzer Division, mostly Viennese), while GD was comprised of troops from all over Germany. > I have no idea of your criteria of effectiveness, but it seems to >differ from mine. Out the six defence zones, the Germans were able to >penetrate one. There was no breakthrough anywhere and the front >retained its integrity. On the Central Front, the Germans advanced >about 20 miles and their attack bogged down on July 10. According to my maps, the first three of these defensive lines were concentric around the salient. The fourth ran rougly across the neck of the salient, while the last two were between the salient and Voronezh. The spearhead of Army Group South reached Prokhorovka, the site of the famous tank battle, which meant it penetrated the third line of defense and was at the fourth. (This, of course, was in the south; you are talking here of the north.) There can certainly be no doubt that the defenses took the teeth out of the blitzkrieg. This must be tempered, however, with the fact that the Soviets knew absolutely where the German attacks would fall, and could thus concentrate their entire reserves (despite internal disagreement) in the crisis area. They also had several months to prepare the defensive positions; Zhukov himself pays homage to the civilian workers who dug the fortifications. >>the Soviets finally launched their counter-offensive eight days later, >>the largest tank battle in the war took place. The Soviets forces >>withdraw first after eight hours of armored battle at point-blank ranges. > > Soviet counterattack took place in two stages. The northern sector >was able to start on July 12, and July 15. The battle that you mention >took place in the south, and was really a part of Soviet defensive >operations in that region. > Now, I don't know who withdrew from that tank battle that you >mentioned first, but in view of subsequent developments, this point >seems of minor significance. Again, the big battle was at Prokhorovka, in the south. It represented the climax of the German attack, and the Germans held the field at day's end. However, they did not stay long... It was significant, though, as he who holds the battlefield gets to recover his damaged tanks and wounded personnel. I would estimate that German casualties would have been far higher if the Soviets had held the field at Prokhorovka. At this point, von Manstein (in _Lost Victories_) felt that the battle had reached its climax, and was about to turn for the Germans. He cites that Soviet casualties in manpower were four times those of the Germans, and believes the Soviets were near cracking. I think his analysis was very mistaken; I doubt he had knowledge of the true magnitude of the Soviet defenses and reserves. He did not withdraw, however, until Hitler relieved him of the SS Panzerkorps (for service in Italy) and 48th Panzerkorps (sent to Army Group Center). >>Sicily and Hitler was vasillating on continuing the offensive. He >>finally decided to withdraw and even pulled the 1st SS Panzer division >>and sent it to Italy. Operation "Zitadelle" was over. > >I find your statement about the SS Panzer division curious. Zukov >doesn't mention it. Are you sure the division was not withdrawn for >refitting, and then subsequently sent to Italy? I find it strange that >a fighting-strength division would be removed from an already weakened >front. What is your source for this info.? The entire SS Panzerkorps was sent to Italy, without refit, following a conference with Hitler on the 13th. It seems possible that Himmler could have impacted on this decision. This is referenced in Manstein's _Lost Victories_, Guderian's _Panzer Leader_, and von Mellenthin's _Panzer Battles_. [ So it appears that Kursk teaches us the same old lesson - doing what the enemy expects and is prepared for never succeeds unless you have an overwhelming material advantage (which the Germans didn't) and sometimes not even then. --CDR] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Bill Thacker Moderator, sci.military military-request@att.att.com (614) 860-5294 Send submissions to military@att.att.com