Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!cs.utexas.edu!mailrus!ames!amdcad!military From: zenon@chopin.llnl.gov (Maciej Zenon Pindera) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: Kursk Keywords: Zukov Message-ID: <27413@amdcad.AMD.COM> Date: 22 Sep 89 06:53:01 GMT References: <27272@amdcad.AMD.COM> <27302@amdcad.AMD.COM> Sender: cdr@amdcad.AMD.COM Organization: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Lines: 127 Approved: military@amdcad.amd.com From: zenon@chopin.llnl.gov (Maciej Zenon Pindera) In article <27302@amdcad.AMD.COM> military@cbnews.ATT.COM (William B. Thacker) writes: > >According to my maps, the first three of these defensive lines were >concentric around the salient. The fourth ran rougly across the >neck of the salient, while the last two were between the salient >and Voronezh. The spearhead of Army Group South reached Prokhorovka, >the site of the famous tank battle, which meant it penetrated the third >line of defense and was at the fourth. (This, of course, was in the south; >you are talking here of the north.) Yes, I was talking of the north. (Zukov did not provide too many details of the southern battle except to emphesize the important role that the Soviet reserve Steppe Front played in helping to contain the German attack.) According to Guderian, this attack did not "neutralize let alone destroy" Soviet infantry, which was subsequently able to isolate German armor from its support infantry. "By the time they reached the Russian artillery they were on their own." And then, "... Model's attack bogged down after some 6 miles" It was in the north that the Soviets placed their heaviest defences, so this is perhaps not surprising. For the battle in the south, Guderian's info. is sketchy, but he does say that "... In the south our successes were somewhat greater, but not enough to seal off the salient or to force the Russians to withdraw." And here, the Soviet defences were considerably weaker. >There can certainly be no doubt that the defenses took the teeth out >of the blitzkrieg. This must be tempered, however, with the fact that >the Soviets knew absolutely where the German attacks would fall, and >could thus concentrate their entire reserves (despite internal >disagreement) in the crisis area. They also had several months to prepare >the defensive positions; Zhukov himself pays homage to the civilian workers >who dug the fortifications. Well, yes and no. Yes, the civilians helped. Yes, the blitzkrieg failed. But ... Guderian -> "Model had produced information, based largely on air May 3-4 photography, which showed that the Russians were preparing deep and very strong defensive positions in exactly those areas where the attack by the two army groups was to go in. The Russians had already withdrawn the mass of their mobile formations from the foreward area of their salient; in anticipation of a pincer-attack, as proposed in this plan of ours, they had strenghened the localities of our possible break-throughs with unusually strong artillery and anti-tank forces." So yes, the Soviets knew where the German attack would fall, just as the Germans knew where the Soviets placed their pieces. Guderian -> "From the area of Bielogrod in the south ten panzer, one panzergrenadier (motorized infantry I guess), and seven infantry divisions attacked, while in the north seven panzer, two panzergrenadier, and nine infantry divisions went in from the area west of Orel." So despite the fact that the brunt of the German attack came from the south, Soviet defences were set up for a major attack from the north. (According to Zhukov, as I posted earlier) Hence no, the Soviets did not know absolutely where German attack would fall. Finally yes, the Soviets had several months to prepare for this offensive, but then again so did the Germans. In fact, they started kicking the idea around in April. They had to prepare for it extensively. For according to Guderian, "...Everything that the German Army could muster in the way of attacking strength was committed to this offensive: Hitler had himself correctly said in Munich that it must not fail, since even a return to our original positions would spell defeat." >Again, the big battle was at Prokhorovka, in the south. It represented the >climax of the German attack, and the Germans held the field at day's end. >However, they did not stay long... It was significant, though, as he >who holds the battlefield gets to recover his damaged tanks and wounded >personnel. I would estimate that German casualties would have been far >higher if the Soviets had held the field at Prokhorovka. Of course you are correct. My comment (which I just erased, but which was to the effect that in the light of subsequent events, it didn't matter who held the field that day) really pertained to the overall operation which ended with the Soviet liberation of Kharkov. The whole thing took ~ 50 days. Of the whole battle Guderian says "Needless to say the Russians exploited their victory to the full. There were no more periods of quiet on the Eastern Front. From now on the enemy was in undisputed posession of the initiative" >The entire SS Panzerkorps was sent to Italy, without refit, following >a conference with Hitler on the 13th. It seems possible that Himmler >could have impacted on this decision. This is referenced in Manstein's >_Lost Victories_, Guderian's _Panzer Leader_, and von Mellenthin's >_Panzer Battles_. Gudarian only says that the armored formations were mangled and that would "be unemployable for a long time to come. It was problematical whether they could be rehabilitated in time to defend the Eastern Front; as for being able to use them in defence of the western front against the Allied landings that threatened for next spring, this was even more questionable." Does Manstein mention exactly when the divisions were pulled out? Their strength? Their role in Italy? It seems to me that if possible, the Germans would have wanted to keep those divisions around if they could be used to contain a Soviet counterattack. But if they felt that their whole sector was folding up, then it would have been been more prudent to save the remenants rather than loosing the whole thing. > [ So it appears that Kursk teaches us the same old > lesson - doing what the enemy expects and is prepared > for never succeeds unless you have an overwhelming > material advantage (which the Germans didn't) and > sometimes not even then. --CDR] Furthermore, if both sides are equally well prepared you can expect a slugfest. But in a slugfest, it's the guy with the horseshoe in his glove that wins. > [ In a slugfest the side with more factories and manpower eventually > grinds out a victory. :-( --CDR] maciej