Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!ginosko!uakari.primate.wisc.edu!uwm.edu!mailrus!ames!amdcad!military From: cdr@amdcad.amd.com (Carl Rigney) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: Learning in War Message-ID: <27443@amdcad.AMD.COM> Date: 23 Sep 89 18:44:56 GMT Sender: cdr@amdcad.AMD.COM Lines: 24 Approved: military@amdcad.amd.com From: cdr@amdcad.amd.com (Carl Rigney) Adrian Hurt writes: > That's an example of what I mean. The Germans formulated a whole new theory > of war (blitzkrieg). The French (and everyone else, for that matter) couldn't > make up defence plans against blitzkrieg until someone had shown them what it > was. Note that the German Blitzkrieg of the 40s was influenced strongly by the writings in the 20s of B.H. Liddell-Hart, a British military historian and theorist. Liddell-Hart's ideas on armored warfare would not have seemed novel to Philip of Macedon, Hannibal, or Belisarius. But 50 years after his principles were applied with great success by the Germans, many nations *still* don't get it. The French failure in WW II was not because the Germans had something totally new, but rather because the Germans had something the French hadn't bothered to learn. Defense plans against Blitzkrieg-style attacks were available in the 20s; the French and British (mostly) ignored them. If the Captains in one war are the Generals of the next, perhaps its not surprising that most armies are always one war behind the technology.