Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!cs.utexas.edu!rutgers!att!cbnews!military From: fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: Learning in War Message-ID: <9928@cbnews.ATT.COM> Date: 5 Oct 89 02:13:54 GMT References: <27388@amdcad.AMD.COM> <27442@amdcad.AMD.COM> <9864@cbnews.ATT.COM> Sender: military@cbnews.ATT.COM Lines: 37 Approved: military@att.att.com From: fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) In article <9864@cbnews.ATT.COM>, amdcad!bnr-fos!.uucp!hwt@watmath.waterloo.edu (Henry Troup) writes: > > > From: amdcad!bnr-fos!.uucp!hwt@watmath.waterloo.edu (Henry Troup) > > In article <27442@amdcad.AMD.COM> adrian%cs.heriot-watt.ac.uk@NSFnet-Relay.AC.UK (Adrian Hurt) writes: > > > >That's an example of what I mean. The Germans formulated a whole new theory > >of war (blitzkrieg). The French (and everyone else, for that matter) couldn't > >make up defence plans against blitzkrieg until someone had shown them what it > >was. > > Well, actually Basil Liddell-Hart invented blitzkrieg - or at least modern > mobile warfare. Also, a careful observation of the Spanish Civil War would > have given a lot of information about WWII tactics - ahead of time. But > no one did listen/see until their noses were rubbed in it. Some younger French officers read Liddle-Hart and others, were convinced, and wrote on the subject themselves. Charles de Gaulle was one of them. They had little or not influence on French war policy, unfortunately. In the U.S., a fellow named Patton, among others, also was a strong proponent of fast armored warfare. He *did* get a chance to use his theories. As for Germany, their main strength, applying Blitzkrieg, also hobbled them. They treated offensive airpower during almost all the war simply as tactical artillery. ------------ "...I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing: and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress, while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization." - Petronius Arbiter, 210 B.C.