Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!ames!uhccux!munnari.oz.au!cs.mu.oz.au!ok
From: ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: Knowledge Representation, A thought experiment
Message-ID: <2418@munnari.oz.au>
Date: 13 Oct 89 09:42:15 GMT
References: <357@massey.ac.nz> <2376@munnari.oz.au> <2394@uceng.UC.EDU> <73510@linus.UUCP>
Sender: news@cs.mu.oz.au
Lines: 60

In article <73510@linus.UUCP>, bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) writes:
> In article <2394@uceng.UC.EDU> dmocsny@uceng.UC.EDU (Daniel Mocsny) writes:
>  > In article <2376@munnari.oz.au>, ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) writes:
>  > > In article <357@massey.ac.nz>, ARaman@massey.ac.nz (A.V. Raman) writes:
>  > > > Hasn't it [Nature] learned from mistakes, just as we do?
>  > > No.  Unless she can form intentions, Natura cannot make mistakes.
> > How interesting to both personify and de-personify Natura in one sentence!

Evidently some of the articles in comp.ai aren't getting through here,
because I didn't see Daniel Mocsny's article.  I do *not* personify ``nature'';
I used the feminine article and the form Natura to stress the personification
that _Raman_ was using.

> Einstein observed that Man is part of Nature, too.

Uh, people have been putting statements like that in writing as far back
as we can read the writing.  I have some metal in some of my teeth, so
that metal is part of me.  Does that mean that I have all the characteristics
of metal?  Obviously not.  The metal is part of nature.  Does that mean that
the scheme of things has all the characteristics of that metal?  Again, no.
So from (part-of X Y) and (has-feature X F) it does not in general follow
that (has-feature Y F).  For some features, it does follow (the properties
of occupying space, possessing mass, and so on).  From the rather banal
observation that human beings exist, no conclusions can be drawn about
whether the scheme of things can make mistakes UNTIL we have first
established that "is able to form intentions" (or some such property)
is one of the few properties which does transfer like that.  This has
not been done.

In fact there is a rather bigger presumption in this woodshed.  The
assumption is that ``Nature'' refers to something.  But what is the
genus of ``Nature'' and what are its differentia?  I have a strong
suspicion that ``Nature'' as a ``thing'' may be about as sensible as
a set of all sets.

> Joseph Campbell suggests that we are Nature's Consciousness.

Well, it's a lovely sentiment, but what does it _mean_?  It certainly
can't be using "consciousness" in the way that it is used when referring
to people and animals.  Consciousness generally includes the idea of
awareness of ones surroundings, and what are the surroundings of ``Nature''?
[It's a very anthropocentric claim too, but that's another story.]

> So at least a part of Nature is
> personifiable and capable of intentional behavior.

Yes, but that demonstrates nothing about ``Nature'', any more than
the presence of metal fillings in my teeth proves _me_ to be made of metal.

> I sometimes make mistakes on behalf of Nature.

How do you know this?  To do X "on behalf of Y" is to assert that Y
wanted X done and appointed you as an agent or representative to
accomplish this in Y's interest.  How does the goddess Natura tell
you what she wants you to do on her behalf?  Does she appear to you
in a dream?  Look, I can tell the nice policeman ''I took that money
out of the man's pocket on his behalf'', but to back it up I have to
show that he did in fact want me to act as his agent in this matter.
To back up the claim that you "make mistakes on behalf of Nature"
you must provide evidence that the goddess asks you to do it.