Path: utzoo!attcan!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!munnari.oz.au!cs.mu.oz.au!ok From: ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Discovering What Nature Wants Keywords: Consciousness and Intentionality. Message-ID: <2433@munnari.oz.au> Date: 15 Oct 89 12:11:12 GMT References: <357@massey.ac.nz> <2376@munnari.oz.au> <2394@uceng.UC.EDU> <74029@linus.UUCP> Sender: news@cs.mu.oz.au Lines: 130 In article <74029@linus.UUCP>, bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) writes: > In article <2418@munnari.oz.au> ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) writes: > > From the rather banal observation that human beings exist, > > no conclusions can be drawn about whether the scheme of > > things can make mistakes UNTIL we have first established > > that "is able to form intentions" (or some such property) > > is one of the few properties which does transfer like that. > > This has not been done. > Are you telling me that you disbelieve that human beings are > capable of intentional behavior? Oh my, that is the direct opposite of what I was saying. Let me try to say it very simply. Kort's argument had the basic form human beings are capable of forming intentions (NOT DISPUTED) human beings are part of ``nature'' (NOT DISPUTED) -------------------------------------------------- ``nature'' is capable of forming intentions. In schematic form, the argument looks like X has property P X is part of Y ---------------- Y has property P Now there are some valid arguments of this form: A battleship's bridge is too big to fit in a Volkswagen A battleship's bridge is part of a battleship -------------------------------------------------- A battleship is too big to fit in a Volkswagen So when P = "is too big to fit in a Volkswagen" the argument is usually valid. But there are some invalid arguments of the same form: An elephant's foot is small enough to fit in a Volkswagen An elephant's foot is part of an elephant --------------------------------------------------------- ** An elephant is small enough to fit in a Volkswagen. My point is that we cannot simply assume that Y has property P just because Y has a part X which has property P. Surely this is an elementary logical observation? Let's try an example which is closer to home. Human beings usually act rationally Mobs are composed of human beings ----------------------------------- ** Mobs usually act rationally Hm. That didn't work, did it? Let's try another one. Joseph Mengele was evil. Joseph Mengele was part of ``nature''. ------------------------------------- ** Nature was evil. That didn't work either. I concede it as a logical possibility that ``nature'' may be capable of forming intentions, making mistakes, &c (though I can't pretend to find it credible). That was not the point that I was trying to make. My point was that the form of the argument is one whose validity cannot be assumed. > > > Joseph Campbell suggests that we are Nature's Consciousness. > He also suggests that humans are not the only beings who possess > consciousness. I happen to agree with him. So? Every known human civilisation has taken this as axiomatic until recent times (gods and ghosts are not human, but are thought to be conscious). The last animal trials in France took place in the 18th century, and it doesn't make sense to try something unless it knew what it was doing. If the argument "X is conscious, X is part of nature, therefore nature is conscious" is valid, then it is valid if there is even one such X. If it is invalid, it remains invalid even if there are 10**15 such X. Every virus in the world could be conscious, and that would not validate the argument. Only Barry Kort might be conscious, and that would not invalidate the argument. > > > So at least a part of Nature is personifiable and capable > > > of intentional behavior. > > Yes, but that demonstrates nothing about ``Nature'', any more than > > the presence of metal fillings in my teeth proves _me_ to be made > > of metal. > I don't follow your logic. That is regrettably clear. This is yet another invalid example of the "X is P, X is part of Y, therefore Y is P" scheme (P is "made of metal"), to drive home the point that the form of the argument is not one which guarantees validity. > As near as I can tell, the Children of Nature wish to survive > and thrive. The evidence for that is overwhelming. Now we have another personification, the Children of Nature. AIDS viruses are children of nature. Pasturella pestis cells are children of nature. Trypanosomes are children of nature. The Europeans who brought smallpox, scarlet fever, measles, mumps, diphtheria, typhus, typhoid, plague, and later cholera and yellow fever to the native population of America, reducing said population from the low hundreds of millions to the low tens of millions in a century or so were also Children of Nature, and so were the diseases which helped them in this accomplishment. I would be glad to hear of any evidence that the Children of Nature *in general* had any interest in the survival and thriving of any other children of nature that they didn't happen to be using as a food source. Oh yes, here we have another instance of the scheme which doesn't work: Human beings want human beings to be healthy Human beings are part of nature -------------------------------------------- Nature wants human beings to be healthy I am basically an optimistic person, with benevolent intentions to all (something to do with never having been hungry and never having had any enemies). But I can find no justification for these attitudes in my biology textbooks (and yes I have read Maynard-Smith).