Path: utzoo!attcan!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!cornell!oravax!daryl
From: daryl@oravax.UUCP (Steven Daryl McCullough)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: Discovering What Nature Wants
Summary: Let's avoid these patronizing tones, okay?
Keywords: Consciousness and Intentionality.
Message-ID: <1087@oravax.UUCP>
Date: 16 Oct 89 16:24:28 GMT
References: <357@massey.ac.nz> <2376@munnari.oz.au> <2394@uceng.UC.EDU> <2433@munnari.oz.au>
Organization: Odyssey Research Associates, Ithaca NY
Lines: 59

In article <2433@munnari.oz.au>, ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) writes:
> [stuff deleted]
> Let me try to say it very simply.  Kort's argument had the basic form
> 
> 	human beings are capable of forming intentions (NOT DISPUTED)
> 	human beings are part of ``nature''  (NOT DISPUTED)
> 	--------------------------------------------------
> 	``nature'' is capable of forming intentions.
> 
> In schematic form, the argument looks like
> 
> 	X has property P
> 	X is part of Y
> 	----------------
> 	Y has property P

Let me call this principle "Kort's rule".

So, far, this is a nice analysis of Barry Kort's argument. Your point, which
is well taken, is that this is not a valid rule of inference, in general.
Then you go on to give a million and one examples, enough to make it obvious
to someone of the meanest of intelligence that it is not a valid rule of
inference. Was this necessary? Obviously Barry believes that "having
intentions" is a property such that Kort's rule applies. He is not claiming
that it always applies.

I think that "ability to form intentions" is a property such that, if a
part of an object has it, then the whole object has it. Common usage is
consistent with this: people often say "this committee intends to ...",
or "Congress intends to ...". It is not necessarily the case that *every*
intention held by the part is held by the whole, but it is surely possible
that *some* intentions are held by the whole are inherited from the parts.

More generally, it is often the case with abilities that, if the part has
a certain ability then the whole has. For example, I conclude that
"Richard O'Keefe can think" from the fact that "Richard O'Keefe's brain
can think". Or I conclude "Elton John can play the piano" from the fact
that "Elton John's brain and fingers, working together, can play the piano".

It is a perfectly legitimate question to ask "what does it *mean* for
nature to form intentions". I think that the question is just as relevent
(and its answer is no clearer) to human beings as to nature. Usually
people are satisfied with something like "Entity E has intentions if it
shows signs of behaving in a goal-directed manner". This definition is
ultimately unsatisfactory, of course, since "goal-directed" is as nebulous
a concept as "intention". However, something like this is the reason
we ascribe intentions to human beings.

Given any definition you like of "goal-directed", it seems that nature
acting in a "goal-directed fashion" follows from human beings acting in
such a fashion. Nature accomplishes something using a part of itself,
namely human beings, as tools, in the same way a human being might use
parts of himself: his brain, his hands, his tongue.

I won't argue that this point of view is correct, or even that I believe
it, but I will argue that it isn't stupid.

Daryl McCullough
(I have a Master's Degree...in Science!)