Path: utzoo!attcan!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!bloom-beacon!spdcc!merk!alliant!linus!mbunix!bwk
From: bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: Discovering What Nature Wants
Summary: Discovering what the self wants.
Keywords: Consciousness and Intentionality.
Message-ID: <74519@linus.UUCP>
Date: 18 Oct 89 04:04:57 GMT
References: <357@massey.ac.nz> <2376@munnari.oz.au> <2394@uceng.UC.EDU> <1087@oravax.UUCP> <2450@munnari.oz.au>
Sender: news@linus.UUCP
Reply-To: bwk@mbunix (Barry Kort)
Organization: The TaoLight Zone, Ste. Elsewhen
Lines: 91

In article <2450@munnari.oz.au> ok@cs.mu.oz.au (Richard O'Keefe) writes:

 > In article <1087@oravax.UUCP>, daryl@oravax.UUCP
 > (Steven Daryl McCullough) writes:

 > > I think that "ability to form intentions" is a property such that,
 > > if a part of an object has it, then the whole object has it.

 > You may believe as you wish.  If you want _me_ to believe the same thing
 > (and I concede that it _may_ be true) you must present good reasons.

Independent of any flaws in my line of reasoning supporting the
thesis that Nature is capable of intentional behavior, I would be
gratified if you would independently discover its truth-value and
identify any necessary restrictions for the thesis to hold. 

...

 > Basically, the ``Nature''-can-form-intentions-because-we-can
 > viewpoint is just reductionism run backwards.

 > > It is a perfectly legitimate question to ask "what does it *mean*
 > > for nature to form intentions".

 > Yes, and I wish someone would try to answer it.

 > > I think that the question is just as relevent
 > > (and its answer is no clearer) to human beings as to nature.

 > > Usually people are satisfied with something like "Entity E has
 > > intentions if it shows signs of behaving in a goal-directed manner".

 > That would give a thermostat intentions.  It would elevate every
 > equilibrium principle in physics and chemistry to the status of
 > "proof of intentions".

In Cybernetics (the System Theoretic approach to Goal-Oriented
Feedback Control Systems), the Thermostat is the classic
example of an elementary Purposive System.

 > With any definition of "goal-directed" that does not take into account
 > the notions of the agent having a model of an actual state of affairs,
 > a model of a hypothetical state of affairs, some way of distinguishing
 > between the agent's ATTITUDES and the agent's ACTIONS (so that we can
 > talk about intentions an agent forms but does not carry out and actions
 > an agent performs without having intended them), with any such limited
 > definition of "goal-directed" we can talk about stones intending to
 > fall down.

The thermostat is a Purposive System because it has a model of 
the current state-of-affairs (the temperature), a representation
of the goal state (the thermostat's set-point or desired temperature),
a calculation of the difference between the current state and the
goal state, and a successful strategy (course of action) for changing
the state-of-affairs (turning the furnace off or on).

 > I have no difficulty with the idea that things happen in such a way
 > that some measure is reduced (i.e. that ``Nature'' may be said in some
 > sufficiently irrelevant way to ``act'' in a ``goal-directed'' way).
 > But that doesn't get us one step further towards ``Nature'' having
 > INTENTIONS.   It is not enough that ``Nature'' should be heading towards
 > the Heat Death of The Universe, just because that's happening doesn't
 > mean ``Nature'' WANTS (intends) it to happen.

Now you're getting into an interesting distinction between the
objective behavior of a purposive system, and the subjective
process by which the goal state is established.  Is the goal
state a happenstantial equilibrium point of a feedback control
loop, or is the goal state selected through premeditation by
a complex information processing system (like the human mind).

 > This tells us, for example, that simply because biological
 > individuals behave as if they wished to live and wished their
 > own species to continue in existence, it does not follow that
 > ``Nature'' wishes either of these things.

I would like to go on record as stipulating that I wish to survive,
and that I wish to ensure the survival of other members of the
Biosphere.

 > > I won't argue that this point of view is correct, or even that
 > > I believe it, but I will argue that it isn't stupid.

 > I am not arguing that it is stupid, but that it needs to be
 > supported by argument, not by assertion.

Are you rejecting my assertion that I wish to facilitate our
mutual survival?  Have I not offered proof that there exists
at least one part of Nature who wants to survive?

--Barry Kort