Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!cs.utexas.edu!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!rutgers!bellcore!att!cbnews!military From: military@cbnews.ATT.COM (William B. Thacker) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Air Combat (was: Fighter Performance vs. Maneuverability) Message-ID: <10261@cbnews.ATT.COM> Date: 16 Oct 89 01:37:36 GMT Organization: BRS Information Technologies Lines: 260 Approved: military@att.att.com From: brspyr1.brs.com!miket (Mike Trout) In sci.military Digest Tuesday, 03 October, 1989 Volume 3 : Issue 9 amdcad!tanner@dssmv1.mpr.ca (Tim Tanner) writes: > In sci.military Fri, 15 Sep, 1989, article 2173 > miket@brspyrl.brs.com (Mike Trout) writes: > > 80% of all airplanes that are shot down by other airplanes never detect > > their attackers. This 80%-20% ratio has held fairly constant from > > World War I up to the present. > I am curious where this statistic came from. It seems likely that it is > true (it is much easier to shoot down an unsuspecting victim). However > I doubt that it is as true today as it was in WW1 and WW2. With all the > fancy equipment on planes today, the least you can hope for is to detect > your attacker. I've seen estimates that the 80%-20% ratio still held up for Viet Nam, as well as for Mideast combat up until quite recently. I haven't seen any estimates for the Falklands, but most of the books on that conflict I've read include quite a few interviews with survivors of shot-down planes on both sides. Most of these incidents still sound like "I was just flying along and suddenly something blew my wing off. Whatever it was, it just came out of nowhere." This is admittedly anecdotal and includes a great deal of flak, but it shows how the more things change, the more they remain the same. Modern electronic warning devices are a long way from ideal. You have to turn them on. You have to operate them properly. They have to function properly. The enemy has numerous sneaky ways of interfering with your warning devices. You have to pay attention and be able to react. Even simple search radar is notoriously prone to error. Supposedly, to this day nobody in the USAF knows how Major Lodge (commander of the 555th TFS) was killed by a North Viet Namese MiG-17 ambush that "should have been" detected by the radars of the 555th Phantoms. It's well known that both US and Israeli pilots intentionally turn off many warning devices to reduce distraction during combat. Technology aside, the best weapon is still a good pair of eyes mounted in a human skull that contains a brain capable of doing what needs to be done. I'd rather have a great pilot in a plane with dead electronics than a bonehead in a super-high-tech XF-999 Starblaster. > Is this a fighter-fighter statistic or does include fighter-bomber kills. A > WW2 bomber was much less maneuverable, but could take more damage and is > unlikely to be destroyed on the first shot from cannon or machine gun fire. > Also it had lots of people to detect approaching fighters. On the other > hand, not many bombers can sneak up on a fighter and shoot it down. Good question. I'm not 100% sure, but I think the 80%-20% ratio includes ALL air-to-air kills, regardless of aircraft type. The ability of big WW2-type bombers to take lots of damage is a bit of an historical aberration, and tends to be exaggerated at any rate. Throughout most of history, big multi-crew planes have had no trouble at all being shot down in droves. > > In air combat, speed is life, because stored energy gained by speed can be > > transferred into what manuver you want. > As I understand it, dogfights today are conducted at subsonic speeds. Being > able to react quickly enough to shoot somebody down at high subsonic speeds > is hard to imagine, but if they do that, why can't they dogfight at > supersonic speeds. They can, but the tradeoffs tend to be too high. Supersonic speed is often thought of as a way of emptying your fuel tank instantly. With the exception of specialized planes such as Concorde and the SR-71, few planes will have any fuel left after more than a few minutes of supersonic flight. At supersonic speed, you'll have time for only one pass at the enemy; that pass may be devastating, but you'll suddenly find yourself in unfamiliar territory with your fuel at bingo. Better to keep your options open in case things go wrong. > Can you fire a Sidewinder at Mach 2? I don't know. Can anybody else answer this? I know that most air-to-ground weaponry cannot be used at supersonic speeds (it would probably miss the target anyway). > > In all the above cases, the earlier planes could greatly > > outmaneuver the newer models. The later planes tended to be big, heavy > > "hot rods" with tremendous firepower, but poor maneuverability. [Two other > > important nations don't really fit here, as neither ever emphasized > > maneuverability, even in the early part of the war. The USA emphasized > > heavy airplanes that could take lots of damage (which later was easily > > changed to an emphasis upon high horsepower with corresponding high > > speed), while Germany emphasized speed, firepower, and innovative > > tactics.] Similar trends can be seen in WWI (Sopwith Pup replaced by > > Sopwith Snipe, Nieuport 17 replaced by SPAD XIII, Albatros D.III replaced > > by Fokker D.VII). > I disagree with your assessment of German planes. I stand by my original assessment. See below. > Germany started off the war with two very different fighters. The Me-109 and > Me-110. The Me-109 was a highly maneuverable fighter, which could or could > not outmaneuver the Hurricane or Spitfire depending on the altitude. Wrong. The Bf 109 was one of the LEAST maneuverable fighters in the world during its heyday. The Hurricane could outmaneuver it under ALL circumstances (although that does not change the fact that the Bf 109 was vastly superior to the Hurricane). The Spitfire could outmaneuver the Bf 109 everywhere except at extreme high speeds, where the planes were about equal. The Spitfire had a 0.5 g advantage over the Bf 109 just about across the board. A couple of qualifiers, however...the Bf 109's horsepower-to-weight ratio was so superior to the Spitfire's (4.66 lb/hp vs. 5.61 lb/hp) that the German pilot could often use his engine power to offset the Spitfire's turning ability. Also, the Bf 109 had automatic leading edge slats. This allowed a good German pilot to extract maximum turning ability from his Bf 109 without fear of stall. A poor Spitfire pilot might be afraid of the maximum turning ability of his plane, since a stall might occur without warning if he wasn't familiar with the plane. All other things being equal, however, the Spitfire's advantage in wing loading (24 lb/ft*2 vs. 31 lb/ft*2) was just too great for the Bf 109 to overcome. But as with the Hurricane, the Spitfire's superior maneuverability did not change things enough...the Bf 109 was the superior plane overall, especially at low and medium altitudes. > The Me-109 was produced to almost the end of the war (if not to the end, I > can't remember). Yes, advanced versions (such as the 109K) were still in production, although the Luftwaffe had been screaming for years to dump the plane in favor of more modern types such as the Fw 190 and (especially) the Me 262. > The Me-109 is comparable to the Spitfire or Hurricane in design philosophy. WRONG. From _Fighter_Combat_Comparison_ (Murray Rubenstein, Tacitus Publications, 1973): "If would be difficult to find two fighters that differed more in design philosophy than the Supermarine Spitfire and the Messerschmitt Bf 109. The English fighter was an elegant design that was a reflection of pre-war British military philosophy. It retained a large measure of the turning ability of the biplane that the British had come to expect in a fighter and it was armed for defense against bombers...The Bf 109 was one of the first fighter designs to accurately reflect the slashing hit-and-run fighter tactics that were to characterize much of the air fighting of the Second World War. It was not designed to turn inside an enemy fighter. Instead, it was conceived as a machine which would bore in on an enemy, fire a single lethal burst, then dive away." > The initial design of the Me-109 was with TWO machine guns in the wings. In the engine cowling, actually (Bf 109A). > Once the German high command found out that the British planes were going > have EIGHT machine guns, they changed their design specs and required eight > machine guns too. Actually, in those days (1936) the rumor surfaced that the British planes were switching from two to four machine guns. The two-gun Bf 109A was therefore canceled in favor of the Bf 109B, which had three machine guns, the additional one firing through the propeller hub. This additional gun was was quickly replaced by the 20mm MG FF/M cannon--a gun that turned out to be pretty useless anyway, due to constant jams and malfunctions. However, the Bf 109 had been designed from the beginning with firepower in mind, and the airframe easily accepted the considerable increase in firepower that was added to later models. Airframes designed without firepower in mind--such as the Spitfire--accepted additional guns only with a lot of kicking and screaming. > The Me-110 was a two engined fighter (nicknamed Destroyer) which single > engine fighters could shoot down due to its lack of speed/performance/ > maneuverablity. The Bf 110 "Zerstorer" was faster than any single engine fighter of the day. Overall performance and even maneuverability were surprisingly good, and the Bf 110 has a bad reputation that it does not deserve. Its only bad record came during the Battle of Britain, where operational orders prevented it from being used properly. At other times during the war, the Bf 110 performed well in a variety of roles. Of course, by the end of the war it was hopelessly obsolete--but that's no different than for any other mid-1930s fighter. > Another German fighter plane that was designed (?) and produced during the > war was the Fw-190. It was suppose to be an excellant fighter, and I think > it emphasised speed and firepower over maneuverability (but I'm not sure). True, and in that respect it was nothing more than an update of the Bf 109 philosophy, taking into account new technology and lessons learned in the early days of the war. Advanced versions of this plane, such as the Fw 190D and the Ta 152, may have been the best propeller fighters of the war. > Saying that "Germany emphasized speed, firepower, and innovative tactics" is > too simplistic and incorrect. In a nutshell Germany went through the same > evolution as the other countries during the war. Again, I'll stand by my original statement, pointing to the design philosophy of the Bf 109. German war theoreticians changed the world in the 1930s, by coming up with new ways of war. Not only did they refine and put into practice the form of armored warfare we now call "blitzkrieg", they also perfected the hit-and-run type of air combat that enabled them to create the revolutionary Bf 109. Just like on land, all other nations had to catch up with what the Germans were doing in the air. > One final point on this, wasn't the Sopwith Pup replaced by the Sopwith > Camel which was very tricky to fly, but highly maneuverable? Calling the Camel "highly maneuverable" is both extremely correct and extremely incorrect. The reason for the Camel's bizarre performance was a combination of its light weight and a powerful rotary engine that created tremendous right torque. The Camel could turn to the right more quickly than any plane in existence, as the engine torque assisted the plane's turning. Turning to the left, against the engine torque, was an exercise similar to turning a supertanker. In fact, an experienced pilot who wanted a 90 degree turn to the left would more likely try a 270 degree turn to the right. This disparity, of course, made for lots of accidents, particularly with mediocre pilots. Also, there are times when you HAD to turn left, and in those cases a Camel was in serious trouble. Luckily, the Camel was also fast, had a good climb/dive rate, and was strongly built with good firepower. Although the Camel was quite successful overall after it had replaced the Pup, its general bizarreness forced the British to adopt a more conventional airplane. This was the Snipe, which was similar to the Camel, but faster, tougher, and heavier, but without the wild torque disparity. You couldn't turn a Snipe like you could a Pup or Camel, but you could use high-speed hit-and-run tactics far more effectively. There were other planes with a torque disparity, such as the Fokker Dr.I Triplane, but the Camel had by far the most extreme performance. Most torque-disparity planes, as well as most lightweight types like the Pup, were eventually replaced by bigger, faster, heavier planes with more firepower. > In WW2, German high command had (initially) a highly trained and well > motivated air crews. However, these crews and their airplanes were used for > missions that they were not designed for. For instance, during the Battle > of Britain Me-109's could not stay over the UK long enough to defend the > bombers since they didn't have long range tanks. I would argue that the Battle of Britain was an aberration; that for most of the rest of the war Luftwaffe crews were pretty much used according to original intent. And even during the Battle of Britain, many German tactical decisions were often as correct as could be expected. When the fighters were allowed to roam freely, they did much better than when they were ordered to stay close by the bombers (no surprise). And if you factor out the Bf 109's fuel problem, they still shot down Spitfires at 1.4 to 1 and Hurricanes at 2.4 to 1. > Also the bombers were one or two engined bombers that were meant to support > the army. They were not designed for actions such as the blitz. This is > the key, the Luftwaffe was created and trained to support the army in the > tactical arena, it was not suppose to be a strategic weapon. So perhaps > aircrew training, motivation, organization, and ability are the most > important criteria. BUT only if the plane and aircrew are utilized > correctly by high command. This is the standard postwar party-line whining excuse from Luftwaffe apologists like Cajus Bekker: "If only we'd developed a heavy bomber force like the Americans and British, we could have won the Battle of Britain and destroyed Soviet industry beyond the Urals. But NOOO....." Balderdash. The Strategic Bombing Survey showed how the hordes of B-17s, B-24s, B-29s, Halifaxes and Lancasters had very little effect upon the overall results. Why would the Luftwaffe have had any different results with hordes of He 177s or some other four-engined plane? Note also how the development of a large four-engined fleet bled Britain white financially, and probably LENGTHENED the war rather than shortened it. If the Germans had developed a large strategic air force, they would not have had enough resources left over to keep a large army in the field. Note also how well the USSR did without a strategic bomber fleet. No, given the limitations of the German economy, plus the Wehrmacht necessity of maintaining large field armies, the design and utilization of the Luftwaffe was just about right. One could nit-pick about certain details here and there--and certainly Goring knew more about fornicating than he did about warfare--but overall I can't see any major flaws in Luftwaffe strategy. -- NSA food: Iran sells Nicaraguan drugs to White House through CIA, SOD & NRO. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Michael Trout (miket@brspyr1)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ BRS Information Technologies, 1200 Rt. 7, Latham, N.Y. 12110 (518) 783-1161 "Who watches the watchmen?" --Epigraph of the Tower Commission Report, 1987