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From: turpin@cs.utexas.EDU (Russell Turpin)
Newsgroups: soc.feminism
Subject: Re: theory and action
Summary: What "individualism" are you arguing
	 against, and why does it matter?
Message-ID: <7064@cs.utexas.edu>
Date: 21 Oct 89 02:40:45 GMT
References: <8910130354.AA03023@mimsy.UMD.EDU> <8910140446.AA08021@mimsy.UMD.EDU> <47048@bbn.COM>
Sender: tittle@ics.uci.edu (Cindy Tittle)
Organization: U. Texas CS Dept., Austin, Texas
Lines: 38
Approved: tittle@ics.uci.edu

In article <8910140446.AA08021@mimsy.UMD.EDU> mangoe@cs.UMD.EDU
 (Charley Wingate) writes:
> >A woman suffers because ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL acts on the
> >basis of her gender.  It is a group phenomenon only to the extent that
> >her membership in the group is made the basis of action.

In article <47048@bbn.COM>, rshapiro@BBN.COM (Richard Shapiro) writes:
> This is astonishing in its naivete. Sexism is about much much more
> than the conscious acts of individuals. It has as much (or more) to do
> with our feelings towards ourselves as it has to do with the actions
> of specific "others" towards us. These days, explicit and intentional
> acts of sexism by one individual against another are comparatively
> rare and are almost never acknowledged as such by the perpetrator.
> Sexism thrives in the way we look at ourselves, in the acts which we
> unwittingly perform with the best of intentions (i.e. not consciously
> on the basis of gender), in the attitues which we share as a common
> basis and which have therefore become invisible to us. Your statement
> exemplifies perfectly the explanatory weakness of the individualist
> position. Sexism is a group phenomenon because it *transcends* any
> single individual. The evidence is all around you.

What is incongruous about the the above paragraph is that the
important parts have little to do with what is so vehemently
argued.  That sexism is often subconcious as well as concious,
that is more often tacit than overt, and that it has as much to
do with self-perception as it does with perceptions of others --
these are not insights that require the assumption that groups
are primary and individuals secondary in any metaphysical or
moral sense.  None of these claims conflict with commonsense
individualism, which Mr Shapiro seems to dislike. 

It is not at all clear to me precisely what "individualist" or
"voluntarist" priciples Mr Shapiro is trying to fight, though
such words certainly set him off.  Some of the points he wishes
to make to Mr Wingate regarding sexism are clear, but their
connection to this other issue is not. 

Russell