Path: utzoo!attcan!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!gem.mps.ohio-state.edu!ctrsol!srcsip!orion!mccarthy From: mccarthy@SRC.Honeywell.COM (Jim McCarthy) Newsgroups: comp.cog-eng Subject: Re: What is the difference between a metaphor and a mental model? Message-ID: <36145@srcsip.UUCP> Date: 24 Oct 89 15:09:18 GMT References: <31966@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> <1215@kuling.UUCP> Sender: news@src.honeywell.COM Lines: 50 In-reply-to: larso@emil.CSD.UU.Se's message of 23 Oct 89 14:49:25 GMT In his posting of 10/23/89, Lars Oestreicher stated: > The form of the mental model, i.e., it's "shape in the mind" is in most > cases impossible to define or study. In my opinion the representation > issue constitutes a less interesting question. My vested interests (I'm doing research on this topic) prevents me from agreeing. At the annual meeting of the Human Factors Society last year, and again this year, my colleague (and fellow graduate student) Mark Cushman and I presented ongoing research posters detailing our work in knowledge representation. In brief, we discussed the relative efficacy (in obtaining valid representations) of two data collection techniques (card sorting and pair-wise comparisons) and three representational tools (Mutidimensional scaling, Cluster analysis, and the PATHFINDER algorithm). Again in brief, we found that there were clear expert/novice differences in the representations obtained (confirming earlier work by others), that, within the Clustering solutions, there was a qualitative difference in the representations stemming from the card sorting and paired comparison techniques, but that, although the experts demonstrated a clear preference for the card sorting solutions, these representations did not differ in there validity (where validity was defined as the ability to complete partial clusters). That is, the card sorting derived clusters were completed just as accurately as the paired comparison derived clusters. My point is this, using techniques such as those discussed here (as well as others) researchers are able to obtain functionally useful knowledge representations. I believe that these representation give us a peek at the mental models resident in experts and novices in a number of domains. Are these representations useful? I believe they are. Mark and I are just beginning a new cycle of research aimed at determing the usefulness of these representations in instructional (as "advanced organizers" or "anticipatory sets") and evaluative settings. Further, it seems to me that such representations could greatly aid in the way information is presented. For example, I can imagine an intelligent menu system which gradually changes its structure as a novice user becomes more expert-like in his/her mental model of the software's function. Because this research line is something of a hobby for Mark and I as we continue our graduate careers is other areas, it is possible we are taking a nieve look at the literature. I'm interested if others on the net feel as we do that these representations portray mental models, and that they are potentially useful in terms of instruction, evaluation, etc.. If you don't feel like posting your opinions please feel free to email me. Jim McCarthy