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From: hb@uvaarpa.virginia.edu (Hank Bovis)
Newsgroups: news.groups,news.admin,news.misc,talk.bizarre,alt.flame
Subject: Re: forgery (was Re: Important announcement)
Message-ID: <1303@uvaarpa.virginia.edu>
Date: 30 Oct 89 20:47:55 GMT
References: <6037@tank.uchicago.edu> <21593@gryphon.COM> <212@ark1.nswc.navy.mil> <36049@apple.Apple.COM>
Reply-To: hb@Virginia.EDU (Hank Bovis)
Followup-To: news.admin
Organization: University of Virginia, Charlottesville
Lines: 26

In article <36049@apple.Apple.COM> chuq@Apple.COM (Chuq Von Rospach) writes:
[Attribution for the following lost. --hb]
##No, it's not.  Perhaps if we (the set of all USENET administrators)
##knew how postings were forged, we'd know how to stop forgeries.

Or perhaps not, at least not in any meaningful sense.  Depending
on the method, it might be that the only way to stop the forgery
be to stop the *genuine* article as well.

#One aspect of a forgery is that the person who is being forged doesn't see
#the message ...
#USENET software looks at the Path: variable and if a hostname in
#your sys file is in the Path:, it won't send the message, since by
#definition that machine has seen it already. So putting [<x>] in the
#path makes sure the message never gets to [<x>].

Also not necessarily true.  I've seen counterexamples to this.

#Chuq Von Rospach <+# Editor,OtherRealms <+# Member SFWA/ASFA
#chuq@apple.com <+# CI$: 73317,635 <+# [This is myself speaking]

hb
-- 
Hank Bovis (hb@Virginia.EDU, hb@Virginia.BITNET)

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