Path: utzoo!attcan!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!att!cbnews!military From: randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Nuc's Message-ID: <11200@cbnews.ATT.COM> Date: 7 Nov 89 02:17:40 GMT Sender: military@cbnews.ATT.COM Organization: U of Ky, Math. Sciences, Lexington KY Lines: 85 Approved: military@att.att.com From: Randy Appleton Here is the summary of the mail replys to a previous question I posted. Basically, I feel that we have more nuclear weapons than are militarily useful, and I wanted to know if anyone else agreed with me. The following quote from the book STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TARGETING by Desmond Ball and Jeffery Richelson was sent to me. "Starkly evident is the gap between a widespread public perception that we live in a world of nuclear plenty, and the military targeter's sense that we live in perpetual nuclear scarcity. The target list is always too long, the warhead supply too short. The reasons for the targeter's sense of poverty are clear. The bulk of the National Strategic Target Data Base (NSTDB) consists of Other Military Targets (OMTs) --- a wide range of targets, perhaps 25,000 in all, that includes conventional fources, military bases and airfields, civilian airfields that could be used by military forces in wartime, space launch facilities, etc. This list has grown relentlessly, from an NSTDB of 4,100 targets in 1960 to some 50,000 today, as each side has expanded its military facilities to offset the other side's expansion. Moreover, to ensure the efficient use of the last available warhead, the targeter constantly lengthens the list to see what the next list of targets would be if more warheads were at hand --- thereby producing a "wish list" of additional targets to be covered. Finally, nuclear war is an uncertain business, so the targeter tries to stack the odds in favor of near-certain target destruction by allocating weapon after weapon. >From a targeter's standpoint, this all makes sense. But a public sobered by images of what a 13 kiloton bomb did to Hiroshima is not likely to comprehend why, according to SAC's targeting criteria in past decades, 300 to 500 kilotons of redundant weapons had to be purchased and aimed at Hiroshima-sized targets in order for SAC to feel assured that 13 kilotons worth of damage would actually be done." In other words, there are so many targets because everything that *could* be militarily significant has been targeted. Also worsening the situation is the military's general "plan for the worst possible case" methodology. I would argue that in a world where every hick town in both America and the Soviet Union has an airport, considering each of those airports to be a military target worthy of 200 kilotons is rediculus. I would think that the fallout from those 200Kt bombs would be worse for the society as a whole than the military significance of destroying just another runway from the tens of thousands available. Another point that was made was that having a more weapons was a psychological advantage. That having more weapons (escalation dominance) would allow us some un-named advantage. But this advantage is never specified. To this I would respond: One can only do so much dammage to a country. Once we've killed 90+% of the economy and 70+% of the people, there is *NO* military utility to killing more. *NONE*, and the Russians know this as well as us. In the world of tactical nuclear weapons, the basic thrust of all the responses seemed to be, "The problem isn't the quantity, but the availability at any perticular spot. Each (pick a favorite sub-unit) needs at least a couple, and that adds up". To this I would say, "No, they don't!" Each regiment doesn't need it's own nuclear field battery, let them ask Corps HQ. I know that inter-unit communication takes time and energy, but.... 1)If it's really a target worthy of a nuclear weapon, it probably will be there in 15 minutes. 2)If inter-unit communication is such a problem, then maybe THAT needs to get fixed. A couple (or 10 or 30) warheads per division, and the same anount per air wing or naval battle group, is *NOT* that much. It maybe adds up to a couple thousand, much less than the 10,000 currently on hand. And I still don't think there is a reasonable secenario where a division might need to use 30 warheads in the time needed to fly in more, or where the entire U.S. Army could go through a stock of that size without the American mainland being attacked. I hope this gets the discussion rolling... Randy randy@ms.uky.edu [mod.note: Actually, I hope it doesn't. As I've said before, this group is not here for the discussion of arms control topics. Those should be discussed in soc.politics.arms-d, which right now needs a moderator. Any volunteers ? Other than that, please keep replies to email. - Bill ]