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From: chasm@attctc.Dallas.TX.US (Charles Marslett)
Newsgroups: comp.os.minix
Subject: Re: New fs/protect.c that allows mortals to chown()
Summary: What Sys V.3 does
Message-ID: <10159@attctc.Dallas.TX.US>
Date: 12 Nov 89 23:03:18 GMT
References: <689.255678C1@mudos.ann-arbor.mi.us> <1989Nov7.185627.24105@world.std.com>
Organization: The Unix(R) Connection, Dallas, Texas
Lines: 22

In article <1989Nov7.185627.24105@world.std.com>, madd@world.std.com (jim frost) writes:
[With respect to allowing the owner of a file (other than root) to issue a
chown() system call]
> I'm curious as to what you do if the file is setuid; do you clear the
> setuid bit?  If not, you make a huge security hole (assuming you
> care, which I do).  If you've done this, please ignore.

System V.3 (the interactive version, at least) does exactly this -- I checked
it Friday, but I forgot to see what the other bits do (sticky, et al.).  I
assume setuid/setgid are the only real security holes?

> jim frost
> software tool & die     "The World" Public Access Unix for the '90s
> madd@std.com            +1 617-739-WRLD  24hrs {3,12,24}00bps

Charles Marslett
===============================================================================
"Those who would sacrifice **  Charles Marslett
liberty for security,      **  STB Systems, Inc. <-- apply all std. disclaimers
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  -- Benjamin Franklin     **  chasm\@attctc.dallas.tx.us
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