Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!rutgers!att!cbnews!military From: mrchards@uxe.cso.uiuc.edu (Matt Richards) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: _Military_Incompetence_ by Richard A. Gabriel Message-ID: <11763@cbnews.ATT.COM> Date: 28 Nov 89 04:34:49 GMT Sender: military@cbnews.ATT.COM Lines: 31 Approved: military@att.att.com From: Matt Richards I have just finished reading the book _Military_Incompetence: Why_the_American_Military_Doesn't_Win by Richard A. Gabriel. Has this book been discussed in this forum before? For those who have not read the book, it consists of seven chapters. The first describes the problems Gabriel sees with the American military. The next five chapters each deal in depth with one of the following operations: the attempt to rescue POW's at Sontay, the Mayaguez incident, the Iranian rescue attempt, the Marines in Beirut, and the invasion of Grenada. The last chapter makes some specific recommendations for reform, including fewer officers, reinstating the draft, less "turbulence" in assignments (moving people around less), slower promotions, and moving retirement from 20 to 30 years of service. Has there been movement towards any of these ideas? He also mentions that one needs a 3 to 1 ratio when attacking an enemy in prepared defense. I readily admit that my only battle experience was a long time ago, one-on-one on the playground. However, I thought that this 3 to 1 ratio had long been dismissed as an over simplification. Another interesting number: "Experience suggests that a corps that ranges between 3 and 6 percent of total strength is the most effective in battle." By corps, he is referring to the officer corps. Comments? Brought to you by Super Global Mega Corp .com