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From: anwst@unix.cis.pitt.edu (Anders N. Weinstein)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: What is a Symbol System?
Keywords: computation, symbol manipulation, syntax, formality
Message-ID: <21032@unix.cis.pitt.edu>
Date: 6 Dec 89 22:25:43 GMT
References: <11640@phoenix.Princeton.EDU> <17189@netnews.upenn.edu> <1656@aipna.ed.ac.uk> <11711@phoenix.Princeton.EDU>
Reply-To: anwst@unix.cis.pitt.edu (Anders N. Weinstein)
Organization: Univ. of Pittsburgh, Comp & Info Services
Lines: 24

"Explicit representation of the rules" is a big red herring. 

At least two major articulations of the "symbolist" position are quite
clear: nothing requires a symbol system to be "rule-explicit" (governed by
representations of the rules) rather than merely "rule-implicit"
(operating in accordance with the rules). This point is enunciated in
Fodor's _Psychosemantics_ and also in Fodor + Pylyshyn's _Cognition_
critique of connectionism. It is also true according to Haugeland's
characterization of "cognitivism" [Reprinted in his _Mind Design_]

The important thing is simply that a symbol system operates by 
manipulating symbolic representations, as you've characterized them.

Many people seem to get needlessly hung up on this issue.
My own suggestion is that the distinction is of merely heuristic
value anyway -- if you're clever enough, you can probably interpret 
any symbol system either way -- and that nothing of philosophical 
interest ought to hinge on it. I believe the philosopher Robert
Cummins has also published arguments to this effect, but I don't have
the citations handy.
-- 
Anders Weinstein		ARPA:	anwst@unix.cis.pitt.edu
U. Pitt. Philosophy       	UUCP:	{cadre,psuvax1}!pitt!cisunx!anwst
Pittsburgh, PA  15260		BITNET: anwst@pittvms