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From: valdes@b.gp.cs.cmu.edu (Raul Valdes-Perez)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: Old AI (was: Re: Some Sequence Prediction Work (actually, synthesis of regexprs))
Message-ID: <7247@pt.cs.cmu.edu>
Date: 7 Dec 89 14:33:16 GMT
References: <11883@phoenix.Princeton.EDU> <5234@bgsuvax.UUCP> <7200@pt.cs.cmu.edu> <11988@phoenix.Princeton.EDU>
Organization: Carnegie-Mellon University, CS/RI
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In article <11988@phoenix.Princeton.EDU> eliot@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Eliot Handelman) writes:
>I went through Simon & Kotovsky ...
>they contend that what happens in the mind must be similar to their program.

I wish you would cite sentences that support this statement.  As I recall,
Simon & Kotovsky provide a model for an empirical phenomenon, compare its
behavior and predictions with observations, and conclude that there is
evidence for believing that the model veridically accounts for the mental
mechanisms involved.  This sounds pretty unobjectionable, being what many,
many empirical scientists do, schematically speaking.
-- 
Raul E. Valdes-Perez