Path: utzoo!attcan!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!rutgers!elbereth.rutgers.edu!harnad From: harnad@elbereth.rutgers.edu (Stevan Harnad) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Cog Sci Fi (was: STRONG AND WEAK AI) Summary: Lost In the Hermeneutic Hall of Mirrors Message-ID: Date: 10 Dec 89 16:48:07 GMT References: <11870@phoenix.Princeton.EDU> <16033@megaron.cs.arizona.edu> <1989Dec9.200649.28014@cs.rochester.edu> Organization: Rutgers Univ., New Brunswick, N.J. Lines: 67 This is a multiple reply, to multiple errors: cam@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) of Dept of AI, Edinburgh University, UK, wrote: > my game is assembly robotics... The assembly agent is designed not only > to succeed in its tasks, but to present a suitable virtual world to the > planner, there is an extra constraint on the task modularisation. That > constraint is sometimes referred to as the symbol grounding problem. As the mint that coined the term, I think I speak with a little semantic authority when I say that that's decidedly *not* the symbol grounding problem but rather a symptom of it! Virtual worlds are not real worlds, and what goes on inside a simulation is just meaningless symbol crunching. The only way to ground symbols is in the real world. Let me add the prediction that whereas a "virtual world" may allow one to ground a toy robot in the real world, it will never lead to what -- for a psychobiologist, at any rate -- is the real goal: A robot that passes the Total Turing Test. The reason is again the symbol grounding problem: Virtual worlds cannot embody all the contingencies of the real world, they can only capture as many of them symbolically as we can anticipate. In ordinary AI this was known as the "frame" problem -- but of course that's just another manifestation of the symbol grounding problem. mike@cs.arizona.edu (Mike Coffin) of U of Arizona CS Dept, Tucson, wrote: > an artificial intelligence living... in a (sub-)simulation on a Cray-9 > would have no choice but to accept the simulated flight to Istanbul to > the AI conference as ``reality.'' Here is the other side of the coin, what I have called the "hermeneutic hall of mirrors" created by projecting our interpretations onto meaningless symbols. As long as you allow yourself to interpret ungrounded symbols you'll keep coming up with "virtual reality." The only trouble is, what we're after is real reality (and that distinction is being lost in the wash). There's nobody home in a symbol cruncher, and it's not because they're on a virtual flight to Istanbul! This is what I call "Cog Sci Fi." yamauchi@cs.rochester.edu (Brian Yamauchi) of University of Rochester Computer Science Department wrote: > My complaint about most AI programs is not the worlds are simulated, > but that the simulated worlds often are very unlike any type of > perceptual reality sensed by organic creatures. It's a matter of > semantics to argue whether this is "intelligence"... > It seems that one interesting approach to AI would be to use the > virtual reality systems which have recently been developed as an > environment for artificial creatures. Then they would be living in a > simulated world, but one that was sophisticated enough to provide a > convincing illusion for *human* perceptions. Illusion is indeed the right word! Simulated worlds are no more "like" a reality than books are: They are merely *interpretable* by *us* as being about a world. The illusion is purely a consequence of being trapped in the hermeneutic hall of mirrors. And that's not just "semantics," it's just syntax... -- Stevan Harnad INTERNET: harnad@confidence.princeton.edu harnad@princeton.edu srh@flash.bellcore.com harnad@elbereth.rutgers.edu harnad@princeton.uucp BITNET: harnad@pucc.bitnet CSNET: harnad%princeton.edu@relay.cs.net (609)-921-7771