Path: utzoo!attcan!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!uunet!wuarchive!usc!brutus.cs.uiuc.edu!apple!well!wcalvin From: wcalvin@well.UUCP (William Calvin) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: The Emperor's New Mind (Book Review) Message-ID: <14975@well.UUCP> Date: 13 Dec 89 12:09:58 GMT References: <14242@eerie.acsu.Buffalo.EDU> Lines: 45 Roger Penrose's book THE EMPEROR'S NEW MIND (Oxford UP 1989) was reviewed by the philosopher Daniel Dennett (he of THE MIND'S I) in the Times Literary Supplement at the end of September. I'll quote a bit: The idea that a computer could be conscious -- or equivalently, that human consciousness is the effect of some complex computation mechanically performed by our brains -- strikes some scientists and philosophers as beautiful. They find it initially surprising and unsettling, as all beautiful ideas are, but the inevitable culmination of the scientific advances that have gradually demystified and unified the material world. The ideologues of artificial intelligence (AI) have been its most articulate supporters. To others, this idea is deeply repellent: philistine, reductionistic (in some bad sense), as incredible as it is offensive. John Searle's attack on "strong AI" is the best- known expression of this view, but others in the same camp would dearly love to see a principled, scientific argument showing that strong AI is impossible. Roger Penrose has set out to provide just such an argument. It is a huge project. In order to build his case, Professor Penrose must lead his reader through detailed discussions of many topics.... Many of these topics have been given excellent popular presentations in recent years -- in Hofstadter's Goedel Escher Bach (1979), Hawking's A Brief History of Time (1989), Gleick's Chaos: Making a New Science (1987) -- but Penrose believes that he must go over this material again in his own way, digging deeper, explaining in more detail. The result is bracing reading, to say the least, and the topics for hundreds of pages apparently have nothing to do with the mind at all. The inevitable first impression, then, is that the book is the ultimate academic shaggy-dog story, a tale whose fascinating digressions outweigh the punch-line by a large factor..... What minds can do, Penrose claims, is to see or judge that certain mathematical propositions are true by "insight" rather than mechanical proof. And Penrose then goes on to some length to argue that there could be no algorithm, or at any rate no practical algorithm [like a computer's performance], for insight. In the meantime I would say that whether or not the Penrose revolution in physics is coming, he has not yet shown the need for the revolution in order to explain facts of human cognitive competence. It's quite a long and refreshing book review (headlined " Murmurs in the Cathedral" for some reason), if you can find the TLS for 29 September 1989.