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From: rapaport@cs.Buffalo.EDU (William J. Rapaport)
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Subject: SUNY Buffalo Logic Collquium
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Date: 11 Dec 89 19:55:59 GMT
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                STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO

                        BUFFALO LOGIC COLLOQUIUM

                               1989-1990

                             Fifth Meeting

        Co-sponsored by the Graduate Group in Cognitive Science

                            MICHAEL SCANLAN

                               Philosophy
                        Oregon State University

        "RECENT MISINTERPRETATIONS OF TARSKI'S THEORY OF TRUTH"

Alfred Tarski proposed what he called Convention T as  a  criterion  for
the  adequacy  of a truth definition.  This convention requires that all
sentences like "`Snow is white' is true if and only if  snow  is  white"
are  implied by the metalanguage theory containing the truth definition.
Philosophers often present it  as  the  key  to  understanding  Tarski's
theory.   There are two camps in the philosophical literature.  One camp
contends that the Convention T sentences provide the central element  in
a  philosophical  theory of truth (e.g., Davidson).  The other camp con-
tends  that consideration  of the Convention T  sentences  reveals  that
Tarski's theory of truth is of no philosophical interest.

In this talk, I consider some recent expressions of the latter  position
in  Putnam  1983,  1985,  1988  and Etchemendy 1988.  I argue that these
authors are led to their negative conclusion by a failure to  appreciate
the exact role served by Convention T in Tarski's work on truth.

REFERENCES:

 (1)   Putnam, Hilary (1983), "On Truth," in L. S. Cauman et al. (eds.),
       _How Many Questions?_ (Indianapolis:  Hackett):  35-56.

 (2)   Putnam, Hilary (1985), "A Comparison of Something with  Something
       Else," _New Literary History_ 17:  61-79.

 (3)   Putnam, Hilary (1988), _Representation and  Reality_  (Cambridge,
       MA:  MIT Press):  60-71.

 (4)   Etchemendy, John (1988), "Tarski  on  Truth  and  Logical  Conse-
       quence," _Journal of Symbolic Logic_ 53:  51-79.

                      Thursday, December 14, 1989
                               4:00 P.M.
                     268 Capen Hall, Amherst Campus

                 Dutch Treat Supper Follows, Place TBA

Future speakers:  A. Garciadiego (Mexico), R. Vesley (SUNY Buffalo),  Z.
Orudjev (USSR), G. Moore (Canada).

For further information, contact John Corcoran, Department  of  Philoso-
phy, 716-636-2438 or 716-881-1640.