Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!snorkelwacker!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!att!cbnews!military From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: Low tech warfare Message-ID: <12212@cbnews.ATT.COM> Date: 12 Dec 89 04:53:09 GMT References: <12150@cbnews.ATT.COM> Sender: military@cbnews.ATT.COM Organization: Oregon Graduate Institute (formerly OGC), Beaverton, OR Lines: 71 Approved: military@att.att.com From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <12150@cbnews.ATT.COM> Brian Ross (bxr307@coombs.anu.oz) writes: > > >From: Brian Ross (bxr307@coombs.anu.oz) > Its interesting to finally see someone in the US start to >recognise the over-reliance of the US military on the use of >technology to produce a solution to a military problem. In >Vietnam it was obvious that the US Army had a policy of pushing >its forces as far into enemy territory as possible. Using them >as bait to draw the enemy into combat and then attempting to >defeat them with superior firepower. Actually elements of the US military made that relization many years ago. Part of the problem was (is) that the militarty's reason for existence was a European war. Everything was justified in those terms, and much of the training was geared towards that end. It was only natural that commanders in Vietnam tried to adapt their training to the situation. That training emphasized firepower and destruction of the enemy. Obviously out of place in a low intensity conflict (LIC). Some elements of the military responded admirably to the demands of LIC. The original conception of the army special forces was certainly not high-tech. The original SEAL teams were low tech groups of individuals, although lately they seem to have been bitten by the high-tech bug. They used some high-tech equipment but the bulk of their work was done with weapons no more advanced than Stoners and rubber boats. The entirety of the USN riverine and coastal forces was low-tech and low budget. PBR's were based on a commercially available stock hull. PCF's were based on a commercial work boat. The only new keel up design was the ASPB, and it was admirably suited to riverine work. The air force also broke out of the European mold with the AC-47, AC-119, and AC-130 series of gunships. These airplanes are only usable where you have locally guarenteed control of the air, such as in most LIC. > By my reading of military history it seems that the US has >always sought a technological solution to the problems of war and >this is becoming if anything even worse with the new emphasis on >the wonders of the silicon revolution. One wonders though what The US has much company in seeking technological solutions to the problems of war. It seems that much of military history is highlighted by just that development; Greek fire, the Roman Corvus, heavy armored cavalry, the crossbow, the longbow, the musket, the bayonet, the machine gun, the tank, etc. I think you are refering to 2 separate phenomena. First, the US has relied on strategies of attrition and resource denial (hardly surprising for the great capitalistic nation :-). Hence the military's fascination with firepower and body counts (granted the body counts were a manifestation of the analytical managerial mindset introduced by MacNamara). Second is a reliance on the most advanced technology. When development cycles were shorter this wasn't a problem. It gave us such palnes as the P-51, P-38, and B-29 , and ships such as the Iowa class BB's in WWII. Today this reliance gives us the B-2, Aegis, and the DIVAD. Part of the problem is that technology is advancing so fast that the antiquated procurement system can't generate the requirements fast enough to keep pace with development. So weapons are developed in the blind (that is doctrine doesn't drive the development). When the weapons are delivered the services then have to find some use for them, or they have to spend years sorting out the bugs because the designers couldn't foresee every possibility. Your question is still valid, what affect will this mindset have if the US enters another LIC. For example, the USN SEALs needed a new long range boat. The ordered a high tech boat that was large, fast, and powerful. What they needed was something that was hard to find, so SEAL squads could be inserted covertly. They are still looking. Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogi.edu