Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!uwm.edu!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!usc!apple!rutgers!njin!princeton!phoenix!roger
From: roger@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Roger Lustig)
Newsgroups: alt.individualism
Subject: Re: re anti-rationalism
Message-ID: <12975@phoenix.Princeton.EDU>
Date: 16 Jan 90 20:57:41 GMT
References: <8060@unix.SRI.COM>
Reply-To: roger@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Roger Lustig)
Distribution: usa
Organization: Princeton University, NJ
Lines: 207

In article <8060@unix.SRI.COM> ellis@chips.sri.com.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes:
>> Roger Lustig >> me

>>>>When we say, "the theory of relativity changed reality," that may well
>>>>be false, given an objective reality, etc.  But it doesn't matter!

>>>    That's simply false. We use the theory of relativity to make
>>>    conclusions about the way things were before the theory of
>>>    relativity was discovered, before there were even any such things
>>>    as humans. 

>>So?  Surely reality, as we see it, includes history.  Our history
>>changed.

>    My, I see we are changing the past now. You really expect me to
>    take you seriously? Is this the extreme to which we must go in
>    order to find "rational" arguments against the O'ists? Is it any
>    wonder that Ayn Rand sells so many books?

No, you don't need to go to such extremes.  In fact, I was taking a
purposely exaggerated attitude in order to make the point I seem to have
failed to make.

As far as changing the past goes, I'm a historian by trade.  I invent
the past every day.  I haven't the foggiest idea what really went on
back then, but I collect evidence and try to put together a picture that
makes sense -- to me and others in my trade.  New evidence rewrites that
picture every time.  

And you know what?  That picture IS the past, as far as we're concerned.
Whatever the "reality," we know nothing but the picture.

Why does Ayn Rand sell so many books?  Well, she talks a good game, and
she lets you know she's right beyond any controversy.  Lots of people
find that soothing -- to have found the Truth.

>    My understanding of the ToR is that we cannot affect anything
>    except that which ultimately happens within our future light
>    cone. If you think something, it is not even coherent within the
>    ToR to suppose that thought might cause reality in distant regions
>    (not to mention past times!) to somehow instantaneously change. 

Fine.  That's a statement about the ideas of physical reality as they're
affected by relativity.  

My problem is with the *perception* of reality, which is what human
beings do.  

To say that relativity didn't exist before, say, the Michelson-Morley
experiment, is, of course, pointless when you're discussing physics, and
I wouldn't dream of doing so.   But when I'm discussing physics, I'm
considering a certain set of perceptions and theories ABOUT those
perceptions: I am not considering reality itself, just a picture that I
(and better draftsmen) have drawn.

>    Again, if it is a choice between Einstein and Roger Lustig's fantastic
>    world, guess who loses?

False choice.  I wasn't competing in the arena of physics.

>>>>As far as anything we care about goes, the WAY OF THINKING about reality
>>>>changed -- and that's all that matters to us!  As far as human endeavor
>>>>(the object of most philosophy) is concerned, there's just no material
>>>>difference.

>>>    Speak for yourself. Your shabby attitude about truth may have been
>>>    trendy among early 20th century positivists, but it is as bankrupt
>>>    today as it always was.

>>..What, tell me, do we USE the idea of truth for anything other than human
>>endeavors?  

>    Why does that make any difference? Is it your point that being
>    used for human endeavors somehow disqualifies something from 
>    being objectively true? It is pretty clear to me that we have
>    utility for objective reference concepts like truth and reality,
>    but even if we didn't, I'd still expect philosophy to be concerned
>    with them. 

What do you mean, "objectively true?"  Nobody even CONSIDERS the issue
of the truth of a matter unless it has some importance to something
else.  

And, tell me, WHY would pilosophy be concerned with such matters if they
were trivial?  Medieval philosophy concerned itself with issues
regarding angels and heads of pins; it dropped such issues when they
were perceived as useless and unimportant.

Now, are "truth" and "reality" as we actually use them "objective
reference points?"  I don't think so.  We like to assume they're
objective, and strive to remove any obvious subjectivities with
reference to some standards of objectivity that WE CHOOSE, but we tend
to approach "reality" in a fairly circular way: it's what fits our model
of it, once we've integrated as many perceptions of it as we can.

>>>    There is what we think is true, and then there is what is really
>>>    true, and attempting to narrow the gap has always been and will
>>>    always remain a philosophical, scientific, and personal matter,
>>>    at least to those who care about the truth.

>>What gap?  How do you know that any narrowing occurs?  

>    I shouldn't have to answer this question to anyone who has ever
>    learned anything, or even briefly examined the history of human
>    knowledge. Depending on the domain of discourse, there are
>    different standards of verifiability and accuracy. If you expect a
>    simple to the question "how do we know", you won't get it. Acquiring
>    deeper knowledge about most things is a matter of practical
>    knowledge gained only through experience.

So you define any process whereby a larger amount of data is integrated
into a model as a narrowing?  That's dangerous: I refer you to
Copernicus, who came up with a better model of planetary motion, better
because it was closer, but one that was actually farther from the one we
have now than what preceded it.  (His epicycles of epicycles fit the
data better, but were a step away from Kepler's model-to-come.)

There's no doubting that we continually build models that help us do
things better than we did them before.  But since we don't seem to want
to define "truth" as something actually residing within the model (after
all, what would happen to it when we eventually discarded the model,
which we always seem to do), then "verifiability" and "accuracy" and
"deeper knowledge" are NOT the same thing as truth.  Truth is an
unattainable standard.

And since we don't actually chase after that standard, but rather strive
to explain what we've seen and build tools to do what we'd like to do,
that big objective truth out there is not the central issue that some
would like to think it is.

>>Maybe the two aren't different by degrees at all, but are completely different
>>entities!

>    Sometimes that happens, sometimes that doesn't. Again, there is no
>    simple answer to how we know which is the case.

In non-trivial cases, do we EVER know?

>>And as for your pious words about "caring about the truth," what makes
>>you think I don't?

>    In your own words:

>ROGER LUSTIG> When we say, "the theory of relativity changed reality,"
>ROGER LUSTIG> that may well be false, given an objective reality, etc.
>ROGER LUSTIG> But it doesn't matter! 

>    "May well be false.. But it doesn't matter" -- Roger, this is
>    disgraceful!

Why?  What harm has it done?  We don't operate within a framework of
KNOWING objective reality.  We may assume there is one, and for all
practical purposes we do.  But we do so very informally, and closer
examination of exactly what we assume and why makes it clear that the
reality we use, day to day, is not the ultimate, objective one.

>ROGER LUSTIG> As far as anything we care about goes, the WAY OF THINKING 
>ROGER LUSTIG> about reality changed -- and that's all that matters to us!

>    Our way of thinking about something is one thing, what that thing
>    really is is another. 

True enough.  What about it?  

>    There really are branches of philosophy devoted to such things as
>    "ways of thinking about something", "viewpoints" and "worlds",
>    phenomenology for instance, and increasingly analytic philosophy
>    as well. There are other branches of thought devoted to other
>    kinds of objects. The kinds of objects that show up in the former
>    bear little or no resemblance to the kinds of objects discussed in
>    the latter. Viewpoints, beliefs, and so on are utterly different
>    kinds of things from what they are about.

Indeed.  But when we think, we're operating on thought, not on the
"things" we're thinking about.

>    By your own admission, you don't care about the difference between
>    your way of thinking about reality and reality itself. Fine.

Oh, on the contrary!  I am constantly updating my view of reality --
thati s, the *informal* reality we all use.

>    So why should anyone who is concerned with the truth pay any
>    attention to you, except to point out the silliness of what you say? 

Concern yourself with the truth all you want.  Call me when you find it.
And let me know how you decided you know.

Look at the ways you use the term "true."  Look at the ways you come to
decide that something is true.  What have you done when you've done so?
How objective were your actions?  What do they (necessarily) refer to?
What things do you assume?

I have no objection to using "truth" and "reality" in fairly informal
ways, and will not argue, say, that the text of the Gettysburg Address
is wrong because we don't *know* he said just those things, and even if
there had been a sound recording it could have been doctored, etc.  I
have no problem with referring to the assertion that that Address began
with the words "Four score" as a true one -- but I make no cosmic claims
for that definition of "truth".

This is in contrast to those who insist that all sorts of axioms about
objective reality are necessary, and that those who do not subscribe to
them completely are on the road to Nazism, mysticism, 43% more cavities,
or whatever.

Roger