Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!ucsd!ucsdhub!hp-sdd!apollo!nelson_p From: nelson_p@apollo.HP.COM (Peter Nelson) Newsgroups: alt.individualism Subject: Re: Phil Ronzone's stereo Message-ID: <481c5419.20b6d@apollo.HP.COM> Date: 18 Jan 90 16:08:00 GMT Sender: root@apollo.HP.COM Distribution: usa Organization: Hewlett-Packard Apollo Division - Chelmsford, MA Lines: 51 Miceal Ellis posts... >>>So in Germany in the 30's and 40's it was MORAL to kill Jews, the insane, >>>and anyone declared by the state to be "unfit"? > >> That's right. By their standards it was OK. > >>>It was MORAL to treat blacks, Chinese, etc. as subhuman in American >>>50 years ago? > >> Again, by the standards of the people doing these things, Yes. > > Slavery, infanticide, Stalinism, Nazism, all these real world horrors > are beyond reason's power to condemn, or so Peter would have us believe. I didn't say it was beyond "reason's power". I said that I am aware of no moral philosophy that has the ability to do so with any intellectual rigor. The original subject, readers will recall, was Objectivism. My point was that Objectivism does not *derive* its ethical values so much as inject them. *AS INDIVIDUALS* we all have the power to condemn the actions of others but we have to remember that other people have different moral values which may cause them to condemn us. If Mr. Ellis thinks that he can use reason to derive a set of moral values that would universally condemn the abovementioned horrors, he is welcome to try and do so. > > Now I ask, is this a reasonable person speaking? > >> That's how the Real World actually works.... > > Your concept of "reason" is not reasonable: it is of negative > utility to real human beings in the real world. The question is whether I am accurately describing the World As It Is. Does Mr. Ellis deny that the NAZIs and others had different moral values than us? Not if I understand him correctly. Instead, he seems to be acknowledging the differences but saying that it is possible to demonstrate in a rigorous manner that one value system is "right" and another is "wrong". Subsumed under this we must assume is some definition of "right" and "wrong" that is not unique to just one of those value systems, since the result of that would be circular reasoning. Mr. Ellis is beginning to sink to Mr. Ronzone's level of attacking *me* rather than putting together his own set of alternative ideas. ---Peter