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From: nelson_p@apollo.HP.COM (Peter Nelson)
Newsgroups: alt.individualism
Subject: Re: re antirationalism
Message-ID: <481c9f86.20b6d@apollo.HP.COM>
Date: 18 Jan 90 17:32:00 GMT
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Organization: Hewlett-Packard Apollo Division - Chelmsford, MA
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Gene Ward Smith posts...
>> In the unlikely event that indirect phenomena, like the existence
>> of alpha particles of electromagnetic wave phenomena becomes an issue
>> then we can all present the evidence for our positions.   I maintain
>> that there is no disagreement about these things among us.
>
>  But these issues are settled by making judgements.

 Wrong.  They are settled by making *OBSERVATIONS*.   Moreover,
 the observations are performed inside of a larger discipline 
 called the *experiment*, in which a question is formulated 
 and the significance of the results is anticipated.  (e.g., 
 "if this is a nuclear phenomenon then when we do _this_ we
 should see neutrons" )   Moreover, in science, the individuals
 involved already share a common set of definitions, axioms, 
 models, etc, which allow the results to be meaningful to all.
 This condition is NOT met in moral or social philosophy or religion.
 I claim that this is why science *advances* and the others do not.


>                                                   We make
>judgements like "General Relativity is the best gravitational
>theory in the classical limit", even though an infinite number of
>other theories fit the data just as well. Is this allowed?
 
 If something is still a matter of theoretical debate then we
 don't consider it a truth.  

>  If it is, why is such a judgement by general consent of those
>who have studied enough to have an opinion acceptable, but
>judgements such as "Beethoven is a better composer than
>Saint-Saens" or "Stalin's policies were morally bankrupt" *not*
>acceptable?

 What do you mean by "acceptable"?  Judgements about which scientific
 theories are true are made by testing and observation.  To the 
 extent that the theoretical agrees with the observed we may bless
 the theory.  This is only possible because scientists have a common
 vocabulary and a common theoretical framework.  Theory X may predict
 particles of a certain mass, velocity and charge and theory Y may
 predict different values, but at least they agree on the definitions
 of mass, velocity, and charge.   The reason why judgements about
 composers and politicians are not comparable is because there are 
 no such underpinnings.  
 
>>Science is not something to "believe in"; it is merely a useful
>>tool which *I* choose to employ where I can.

>  Since you are unwilling to assert there is any truth in
>scientific pronouncements, I'm not surprised you think the same
>of judgements of value.

 I didn't say it wasn't "true", I said I don't take it on faith 
 the way religionists take their truths.    


> But then why pick on those who believe
>there is something more to truth than utility? Do you think they
>are wrong? What do you *mean* by thinking this, if so?

  They might be right as rain, for all anybody knows.  There might
  be flying saucers visiting us every night.   Being right is not
  the point; being able to demonstare it in the Real World is 
  what I'm using as my standard.   What do YOU propose as an
  alternative?

>  Pragmatism is not pragmatic--it fails on its own terms.

  Cute slogan, but what does it mean?    I would counter it 
  with the tautological: pragmatism is the only thing that works.

  The bottom line is that moral philosophy, using its methods, has 
  made no demonstrable progress for centuries or perhaps longer.
  The fact that we have *different* moral values today than a few
  hundred years ago does not show that moral philosophy is capable
  of describing the world with any greater precision or accuracy
  than in the past or that it can predict human conduct any better
  than in the past.   Moreover, the philosophers themselves seem no
  closer than in the past to agreeing on fundamental terms or models
  that would make it possible for them to resolve theoretical
  disputes.    There is no reason to believe that the *methodology*
  employed by most social philosophers actually works.

                                                   ---Peter