Xref: utzoo talk.philosophy.misc:3771 comp.ai:6310 Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!samsung!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!cica!iuvax!rutgers!bpa!sjuphil!tmoody From: tmoody@sjuphil.uucp (T. Moody) Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,comp.ai Subject: Re: Why the Chinese Room doesn't convince Keywords: intentionality consciousness Searle Message-ID: <1990Mar19.153959.6113@sjuphil.uucp> Date: 19 Mar 90 15:39:59 GMT References: <23100@mimsy.umd.edu> Reply-To: tmoody@sjuphil.UUCP (T. Moody) Distribution: na Organization: Saint Joseph's University Lines: 39 In article <23100@mimsy.umd.edu> flink@mimsy.umd.edu (Paul V Torek) writes: >Just thought I'd inject an interesting fact into the Chinese Room discussion. >In a recent article (in _Philosophical Topics_, I think) Searle claims >that only conscious beings can have intrinsically intentional states >(that is, mental states with a non-derivative semantic value). Thanks for the pointer; I'll take a look at the article. To return the favor, there was a very interesting article by Tim Maudlin in _Journal of Philosophy_ last year, entitled "Computation and Conscioussness." Unfortunately, I don't have the exact reference, because the last six months of JP 1989 in our library are now at the binder. I do know that the article is in that range (the last six months of 1989). For my own part, I am convinced that such phenomena as "understanding Chinese" must be analyzed into *four* components: 1. Behavioral -- what the Turing Test tests. 2. Intentional -- causal/referential properties. 3. Computational/functional -- sets constraints upon the *how* of (1) and (2), supports counterfactuals, etc. 4. Phenomenological -- the subjective, experiential character (if any) of the process. Searle may be understood as arguing that (1) and (3) alone do not "constitute" understanding, because they do not guarantee (2) and (4). I believe he is right. -- Todd Moody * tmoody%sjuphil.sju.edu@bpa.bell-atl.com (Whatever that means) "The mind-forg'd manacles I hear." -- William Blake