Xref: utzoo talk.philosophy.misc:3873 comp.ai:6516 Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!mcsun!ukc!tcdcs!swift.cs.tcd.ie!maths.tcd.ie!ftoomey From: ftoomey@maths.tcd.ie (Fergal Toomey) Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,comp.ai Subject: Re: Why the Chinese Room doesn't convince Keywords: functional definitions, understanding, Message-ID: <1990Apr6.144947.11473@maths.tcd.ie> Date: 6 Apr 90 14:49:47 GMT References: <23100@mimsy.umd.edu> <1990Mar19.153959.6113@sjuphil.uucp> <0541@sheol.UUCP> <1990Mar26.155415.21756@sjuphil.uucp> <0556@sheol.UUCP> <1990Apr3.162019.27598@maths.tcd.ie> <1990Apr5.202224.27534@caen.en Organization: Dept. of Maths, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland. Lines: 103 In article <1990Apr5.202224.27534@caen.engin.umich.edu> zarnuk@caen.engin.umich.edu (Paul Steven Mccarthy) writes: >You are assuming that "understanding" has some meaning beyond the >information that can be gleaned from observation. I disagree. I >assert that "understanding" should be defined by functional behavior. > >In the example that you presented of the novice assisted by Kasparov >(the international grand master), I would say that the system being >observed: novice+Kasparov did _indeed_ display "understanding" of >chess. Making the knowledge of Kasparov's influence hidden is simply >hand-waving. If the observer was specifically interested in the >novice's un-aided "understanding" of chess, then the observer should >have taken appropriate measures to insure that the novice was not >receiving advice from external sources. Granted, this cannot be >known for certain in every situation, but that is a statement about >how easy it is to fool humans -- not about the meaning of "understanding". Perhaps I should have chosen a better example. The novice+Kasparov idea was originally intended to parallel the computer+programmer idea in computer science. If you argue that the system under consideration is not just the novice, but the novice *plus* Kasparov, then what can we say about an apparently intelligent computer program? Must we say that it is not the computer that is intelligent, but the computer *plus* its programmer? Let me put it like this: suppose the novice has brain damage, so that he is incapable of understanding chess, but he is capable of carrying out simple instructions. He is also capable of speaking English fluently. He is given a long list of instructions from Gary Kasparov telling him exactly what move to make in every board situation that can possibly arise during a chess game (the number of possible board configurations is very, very high, but finite). You now start playing chess with the novice, as well as with one other, normal, average chess player. You are, of course, beaten by the novice+list system, but you beat the normal, average, player. You conclude that the novice+list system has a better understanding of the game than the normal player. You ask the normal player: "Why do you think you lost?" "Well, I think I shouldn't have castled on move 8... and maybe I should have moved my queen out earlier... " You ask the novice+list (the novice remember, can speak English fluently), "Why do you think you won?" "Well, uhmm, yes, ... er," My point is that the system "novice+list" has no understanding of the game, although it can beat you every time. The list corresponds to a computer program, the novice to a computer. Saying that we must consider the "Kasparov+novice+list" system instead is equivalent to saying that we must always consider the "Programmer+computer+program" system instead of the "computer+program" system. This argument is demonstably false, in that chess-playing programs have been written which consistently beat their authors. Clearly these programs were not simply programmed to play "brute-force" chess, they were deliberated programmed to analyse the game, to think up new moves, ... to "understand". Unfortunately, there is no way of distinguishing between a "brute-force" program and an "understanding" program if you consider only their behaviour: you have to look at the algorithms themselves. >Certainly the algorithms employed by a system affect the level of >"understanding" that the system can display, but the idea that there >is a "magical" algorithm that represents "true" understanding, while >all other algorithms represent ignorance is absurd. Even the idea >that there is a fuzzy boundary between algorithms which display >"understanding" and algorithms that do not is highly suspect. IMO, there is a fuzzy boundary between the two, and I do not see at all why this should be highly suspect. People make all kinds of distinctions between algorithms already, for example between "brute force" algorithms and "insight" algorithms. Why shouldn't we be able to say: "This computer has been programmed to play chess, and this computer has been programmed to *understand* how to play chess (and in fact the first computer has beaten Kasparov, but the second computer has given Kasparov some hints to improve his game next time)." >To my mind, there can only be a _functional_ definition of >"understanding". How do you know that Kasparov uses a different >algorithm for playing chess than the computer? Better yet, how >do you know that Kasparov "understands" chess -- except by virtue >of his behavior? I don't. Before the arrival of computers, the question would never have been asked, everyone simply assumed that other people thought in the same way. I can't open up Kasparov's head and have a look at his algorithms, and until I can, I'll simply choose to give him the benefit of the doubt. The question has more relevance, though, when applied to computers. Fundamental problems in artificial intelligence are linked to questions about understanding and interpretation. For these problems, brute-force solutions just don't work, yet the human mind solves them without any difficulty, often in a matter of seconds. IMO an understanding of what "understanding" is will help us to produce algorithms which solve these problems. >---Paul... (P-K4, P-Q4 -- a Queen's gambit?!) Fergal Toomey.