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From: kp@uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,comp.ai
Subject: Re: Why the Chinese Room doesn't convince
Summary: Understanding can be inferred from the ability to explain
Keywords: functional definitions, understanding, explanation
Message-ID: <7cn102fg9ahA01@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com>
Date: 7 Apr 90 23:55:02 GMT
References: <c4Rk02dr8dI001@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com> <23100@mimsy.umd.edu> <1990Mar19.153959.6113@sjuphil.uucp> <0541@sheol.UUCP> <1990Mar26.155415.21756@sjuphil.uucp> <0556@sheol.UUCP> <1990Apr3.162019.27598@maths.tcd.ie> <1990Apr5.202224.27534@caen.en <1990Apr6.14494
Reply-To: kp@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting)
Organization: Amdahl Corporation, Sunnyvale CA
Lines: 64

In article <1990Apr6.144947.11473@maths.tcd.ie> ftoomey@maths.tcd.ie (Fergal Toomey) writes:
>Let me put it like this: suppose the novice
>has brain damage, so that he is incapable of understanding chess, but
>he is capable of carrying out simple instructions. He is also capable
>of speaking English fluently. He is given a long list of instructions
>from Gary Kasparov telling him exactly what move to make in every
>board situation that can possibly arise during a chess game . . .
>. . . You ask the normal player:
>
>"Why do you think you lost?"
>
>"Well, I think I shouldn't have castled on move 8... and maybe I should have
>moved my queen out earlier... "
>
>You ask the novice+list (the novice remember, can speak English fluently),
>
>"Why do you think you won?"
>
>"Well, uhmm, yes, ... er,"

Fergal's improved example *is* much better, but I'd like to stregnthen
his point, if I can.

The brain-damaged novice with the list is perhaps more likely to say:

"I won becouse I got these instructions from Gary Kasparov.  Cost me
 a *fortune*, but it was worth it.  I win every time.  Just don't ask
 me to play without this list."

The novice's explanation could be quite informative, and even rational,
but (by hypothesis) it could not mention much about *chess*, its rules,
possible strategies, et. al.

The everyday test for understanding of a subject is to ask for an
explanation.  This is a practical, functional, empirical procedure.

Take another example.  We all know how to think.  But none of us can
explain how we think.  We would agree, I suppose, that we do not
understand thinking.  Partial explanations exist; these are indicative
of partial understanding.

(Paul McCarthy:)
>>To my mind, there can only be a _functional_ definition of 
>>"understanding".  How do you know that Kasparov uses a different
>>algorithm for playing chess than the computer?  Better yet, how
>>do you know that Kasparov "understands" chess -- except by virtue
>>of his behavior?

(We should distinguish between a definition and a criterion for applying
 a predicate, but I'll let it pass)

The criterion for "being able to play chess" is winning games, or at least
playing without breaking the rules too often.  The criterion for
understanding chess is explaining games, or at least not being
dumbfounded before them.

I think it's possible to give a more precise account of understanding,
but all I've tried to do here is to show that "understanding" is NOT
some bizarre philosopher's daydream, but an everyday useful concept.

Especially useful for AI!


Ken Presting