Xref: utzoo talk.philosophy.misc:3882 comp.ai:6534 Path: utzoo!censor!geac!torsqnt!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!swrinde!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!cica!iuvax!rutgers!umn-d-ub!cs.umn.edu!thornley From: thornley@cs.umn.edu (David H. Thornley) Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,comp.ai Subject: Re: Why the Chinese Room doesn't convince Keywords: functional definitions, understanding, Message-ID: <1990Apr8.160030.1988@cs.umn.edu> Date: 8 Apr 90 16:00:30 GMT References: <23100@mimsy.umd.edu> <1990Mar19.153959.6113@sjuphil.uucp> <0541@sheol.UUCP> <1990Mar26.155415.21756@sjuphil.uucp> <0556@sheol.UUCP> <1990Apr3.162019.27598@maths.tcd.ie> <1990Apr5.202224.27534@caen.en <1990Apr6.14494 Organization: University of Minnesota, Minneapolis - CSCI Dept. Lines: 68 In article <1990Apr6.144947.11473@maths.tcd.ie> ftoomey@maths.tcd.ie (Fergal Toomey) writes: >In article <1990Apr5.202224.27534@caen.engin.umich.edu> >zarnuk@caen.engin.umich.edu (Paul Steven Mccarthy) writes: > >>You are assuming that "understanding" has some meaning beyond the >>information that can be gleaned from observation. I disagree. I >>assert that "understanding" should be defined by functional behavior. >> >>In the example that you presented of the novice assisted by Kasparov >>(the international grand master), I would say that the system being >>observed: novice+Kasparov did _indeed_ display "understanding" of >>chess. Making the knowledge of Kasparov's influence hidden is simply >>hand-waving. If the observer was specifically interested in the >>novice's un-aided "understanding" of chess, then the observer should >>have taken appropriate measures to insure that the novice was not >>receiving advice from external sources. Granted, this cannot be >>known for certain in every situation, but that is a statement about >>how easy it is to fool humans -- not about the meaning of "understanding". > >Perhaps I should have chosen a better example. The novice+Kasparov >idea was originally intended to parallel the computer+programmer idea >in computer science. If you argue that the system under consideration >is not just the novice, but the novice *plus* Kasparov, then what can >we say about an apparently intelligent computer program? Must we say >that it is not the computer that is intelligent, but the computer >*plus* its programmer? > >Let me put it like this: suppose the novice >has brain damage, so that he is incapable of understanding chess, but >he is capable of carrying out simple instructions. He is also capable >of speaking English fluently. He is given a long list of instructions >from Gary Kasparov telling him exactly what move to make in every >board situation that can possibly arise during a chess game (the number >of possible board configurations is very, very high, but finite).... I am starting to wonder if one of the real problems in these discussions is the high proportion of impossible thought experiments. The number of possible board configurations is far too high for any sort of exhaustive search pattern to be applied within the confines of the known universe. Certainly it is far too high for one human to go through. This is also a problem with Searle's Chinese Room arguments. The man seems to have no conception of how big a program to simulate human intelligence would have to be, and how difficult it would be to implement by means of paper and pencil. Frankly, I don't think that Searle could perform the symbol manipulations sufficiently accurately to implement such a program. Certainly he could not memorize the program and the data, as he has stated he could do in the Scientific American article. I dislike two consequences of this. First, I think it is intellectually sloppy, almost to the point of dishonesty. If I were arguing about the country's transportation network, and I questioned the need for intra-city roads by saying that people could walk at 20 mph, people would lose all respect for me. If I argue about artificial intelligence and say I can implement a human-intelligence simulator mentally, or that I can get Gary Kasparov to give me written instructions on how to play chess at his level, I should get quite the same treatment. Second, it trivializes the problems involved. Programming a chess computer or a human-intelligence simulator is not a small feat, cannot be duplicated by memorizing lists of rules or board positions, and should not be treated as if they can. If intelligence were a "trick" or something that could be easily implemented, AI researchers would have succeeded back in the '50s. The fact that nobody has managed to create a machine capable of human intelligence, or one that can defeat the World Champion at chess reliably, indicates that the problems are quite difficult. David Thornley