Xref: utzoo talk.philosophy.misc:3912 comp.ai:6581 Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!uunet!samsung!umich!caen.engin.umich.edu!srvr1!zarnuk From: zarnuk@caen.engin.umich.edu (Paul Steven Mccarthy) Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,comp.ai Subject: Explanations != Understanding. Summary: Maybe "understanding" is an over-loaded operator. Keywords: functional definitions, understanding, explanation Message-ID: <1990Apr12.165907.28054@caen.engin.umich.edu> Date: 12 Apr 90 16:59:00 GMT References: <23100@mimsy.umd.edu> <1990Mar19.153959.6113@sjuphil.uucp> <0541@sheol.UUCP> <1990Mar26.155415.21756@sjuphil.uucp> <0556@sheol.UUCP> <1990Apr3.162019.27598@maths.tcd.ie> <1990Apr5.202224.27534@caen.en <19 <7cn102fg9a Sender: news@caen.engin.umich.edu (Mr. Usenet) Organization: University of Michigan Engineering, Ann Arbor Lines: 79 >(Ken Presting) writes: >The [...] problem with explanations and understanding is that >we normally suppose that someone who provides an explanation is not just >exhibiting a skill which is *additional* to the expertise they display >in practice. We expect that when Kasparov explains chess, the ability to >explain is *part* of his ability to play. Oops, more of those durned assumptions. They seem to be roaming all over this newsgroup. >Paul's example of the program with the bolt-on explanation feature shows >that this expectation is simplistic. The conclusion to be drawn, I think, >is not that the capacity to explain one's choices is irrelevant, but >that the capacity to explain is not a sufficient condition for what we >call "understanding". >As far as I know, there have been no elegant solutions to the problem >of stating such a sufficient condition, either in the case of intentional >action or of understanding. I would take the issue one step farther. I think we are trying to pile too many different conotations under the single label of "understanding". So far we have seen (on this newsgroup at least): 1. Ability to perform successfully. (win playing chess) 2. Ability to explain the choices made during the performance. (Why did you win/lose?) 3. Ability to perform similar tasks. (8x9 chess-board) **4. The actual algorithms used to perform the task. (Some algorithms "understand", others do not). ** 5. Knowledge of the "strategy" of the game, and the ability to put that knowledge into practice. 6. Ability to reason about example games and formulate chess "strategy" from them. 7. Knowledge of the history of the game. (Who was the world champion in 1962?) ** (I _strongly_ disagree with this one, but it was presented here, and included it for completeness). I'm sure each of us could add many other abilities / constraints on the term to extend this definition to "capture the essence and subtlty" of the fuzzy notions that we carry in our heads. I'm just as sure that no two definitions would be exactly alike, and I have a strong feeling that no intersection or union of the definitions would satisfy everyone's intuitive notion of what "understanding" means. Item #4 above is a good example of why I think we would fail to generate a universally acceptable definition of "understanding". Why don't we just face up to the facts? The term, "understanding", is an over-simplification. Excuse me for my empiricist thinking, but let's stick to concepts that we can define unambiguously -- preferrably with measurable characteristics. I know this is contrary to a lot of the "new" thinking these days, but I think most of this "new" thinking is just "old" sloppy thinking. Those big, fuzzy terms. They're so *easy* to use, and they make you feel great too. You try rubbing them out, and soaking them out, and still... > [...] Just trimming the fuzz >on the concept of "understanding" is very tough. The "precise account" >I have in mind for "understanding" does *not* preserve the intuitive >connection between understanding an activity and being able to perform >it. I would be very surprised if *anyone* could provide a generally satisfactory definition for the term. (I apologize for putting you on the hot seat, but you did say...) >Fortunately, the Chinese room argument can be re-stated without any >appeal to the concept of "understanding". Isn't "understanding" the point of the Chinese Room? My point is that Searle et. al. are chasing fantasies. ---Paul... (Stick to the classics, you know, Gallileo, Gauss...)