Path: utzoo!utgpu!watserv1!watmath!att!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!usc!apple!amdahl!kp From: kp@uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Plaiting a Plexus of Processes (Was: Re: Chess, Reduct...) Summary: Primary Processes operate on Homomorphism of Logical Structure Keywords: fantasy, primary process, homomorphism, logical structure Message-ID: <43pQ024H9chW01@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com> Date: 13 Apr 90 04:20:47 GMT References: <369@ntpdvp1.UUCP> Reply-To: kp@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting) Organization: Amdahl Corporation, Sunnyvale CA Lines: 128 In article <369@ntpdvp1.UUCP> sandyz@ntpdvp1.UUCP (Sandy Zinn) writes: >>(Ken Presting wrote:) > ... to my old "identity of incomparable categories", I'd add: > >> rules = representation = processes = perception = methods = models > >The Dotland Identity. [ which has something to say but leaves a lot unsaid ] Hmm. Sooner or later, we have to start taking our algebra seriously, or we'll end up saying everything ... Dotty allegories are fine for now :-) > > . . . Bateson argues, and I agree with him, that dream >metaphors are not *result* but *source*. Insofar as Mind is representa- >tion, it is a metaphor for whatever is being represented. This account of how representations can exist in the mind is IMO the only possible coherent view. (It needs to made a little more coherent itself, of course). If Quine and Davidson are to be taken seriously on the issue of indeterminacy of translation, inscrutability of reference, and the holism of meaning, then we cannot build a machine which learns a human language in the way humans do unless REFERENCE IS EXCLUDED FROM REPRESENTATION. This means: no concept training, no semantic nets, and NO FRAMES! (Minsky has the gall to describe _The Society of Mind_ as "neo-Freudian". But perhaps that should be excused as an easily explainable parapraxis: Freudian :: Froodian :: Fodorian!) >Bateson says: > > ...the subject matter of primary-process discourse is different from > the subject matter of language and consciousness. Consciousness talks > about things or persons, and attaches predicates to the specific things > which have been mentioned. The easy identification of consciousness with language here is entirely legitimate within the Freudian framework, but can be very confusing. Experience as a whole must not be identified with consciousness alone, and conscious experience itself is not exhausted by linguistic events. Perception and imagination are of course structured, but often very differently from language. > In primary process the things or persons > are usually not identified, and the focus of the discourse is upon the > *relationships* which are asserted to obtain betweeen them. > >I suggest that this primary process is Dotland, is Implementationism. Homomorphisms of logical structure work much better here. Impl'ism is about the relation between complete abstractions (ie whole formal systems). But within an abstraction, each predicate, singular or relational, also has a logical structure which is determined by the sentences in which the predicate is used. > > A metaphor retains unchanged the relationship which it "illustrates" > while substituting other things or persons for the relata. > >Gee, this sounds like a Normative Property! (or do I seriously mistake you?) Pretty close! Since the logical structure of a term is independent of (ie invariant over) any particular semantic mappings or interpretations, *any* term or concept can function in a metaphor. Or primary process. Properties are normative, intentional or merely descriptive based on the rest of the abstraction in which they are being defined, and on how that abstraction is supplied with a semantics: Perceptual mapping - descriptive, eg "It's hot today" Interpretive mapping - intentional, eg "She thinks it's hot today" Mapping onto preferences - normative, eg "It's a good day for volleyball!" Fantasized mapping - abstract, eg "PV = nkT & V = 4(pi)r**3/3" Ritual - no semantics, just part of that squirmin' Way of Life, eg "Wanna play a language game? I'll go first: SLAB!, no, THERMOMETER!" (cf Wittgenstein, _Philosophical Investigations of Primary Process_) > > Primary process is characterized (e.g., by Fenichel) as lacking > negatives, lacking tense, lacking in any identification of > linguistic mood (i.e., no identification of indicative, sub- > junctive, optative, etc.) and metaphoric. > >Dreams. Fantasy. Ritual. The relationships just ARE, period. NoPunctuation!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!! >relationships are primarily iconic, or analogic: it is a *pattern* >which is represented, a style of relationship, if you will. The >digitalization of information comes only at the level of language. >Logic, a set of digital relationships, is imposed on dreams. 000 000 000 00 0 0 # 0 0 # 0 # 0 # 0 # 0 # 0 # # 010 10 10 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 See - some relationships are *not*. I have not completely figured out how to do this non-digitally, but I am engaged in a process of Elimination. Question: What is the original normative property? The leading hypotheses are "alone", "hard/wet", "breast", and "ca-ca". > >The question becomes, can Edelman's neural-processor code for this kind >of primary process? My guess is yes. I can't make heads nor tails out of Edelman's head. Itelya, *Heidegger* is easier reading than Edelman. But my impression is that Edelman's reentry is out of phase, and his imagination is degenerate. This may just be a negative transference, of course. Ken Presting ("OK, Anatomy IS Destiny. Now put away that cigar")