Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!att!cbnews!military From: GA.CJJ@Forsythe.Stanford.EDU (Clifford Johnson) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Time-lapse PALs on nuclear attack subs Message-ID: <15509@cbnews.ATT.COM> Date: 12 Apr 90 00:56:22 GMT Sender: military@cbnews.ATT.COM Lines: 170 Approved: military@att.att.com From: "Clifford Johnson" Here's some responses to various replies I received that were critical of my suggestion that subs. have (time-lapse) PALs. I remain convinced the idea is essentially sound, and implementable in the latest (LF/ULF) communication techniques. (Is sonar a possibility, given the ability of whales to communicate by sonar over a thousand miles?) Note the additional idea that the time-lapse could be elongated differentially to as long as subs today expect to go without a communication from HQ. That is, the system could be implemented so that the lack of a refreshment signal initiates the 24-hour (say) time-lock lapse on the PAL only *after* a succession of actual attempts by the sub to hear the 6-hourly (say) signal. Thus, submarines under the Artic ice, or lying still for days, could be kept with their PALs in effect indefinitely. ********************** > Also, any scheme that relies on continuous reception of a signal, without > a feedback path so that headquarters can monitor the reception, can quite > probably be defeated by just cutting a wire. > First, it would be fairly easy > to fool the communications system that it didn't > get a signal (by damaging the antenna, receiver or cable) > and arm the system anyway. I think the system could be designed to make this most difficult, so as to assure that it could only happen with the knowledge of many crew members some of whom would be involved in inspection/repair/listen procedures. The system could broadcast to the entire crew a FAILURE TO RECEIVE after missing even the first 6-hourly (say) signal, and the system would have a redundant backup or three, besides being simple and robust. 24 hours is a long time to reflect and adjust. Supposing that all communications were lost for that period, that very circumstance today is de facto authorization to consider actual launch -- we wouldn't be in more risk than we are now, I propose cutting the risk of accident greatly in the normal day-to-day situation. > Second, if they do find out an attack has taken place, they > might have to wait a day to unlock the missiles, while they are > being stalked by enemy subs or contending with damage of their own. The chances of failing to destroy a hidden submarine in 24 hrs. are so great, and the damage inflicted by one (let alone several) of them is so vast (every major city wasted) that deterrence is as good as unaffected. > The main problem with broadcast PAL codes is the > danger that the 'other side' [USA, UK, USSR, PRC or > France, depending who might be using BPALs] could > acquire the codes and braoadcast them even after the > proper broadcaster has become as one with the ionosphere, > preventing the sub from retaliating Each submarine could have its own [coded] signal, separately managed, making the task of code-breaking multiple. In sum, I think the system could be designed so that deterrence was not significantly reduced. In my opinion, the theoretical chance of perfect imitation signals after a strike poses a second-order type of risk, compared to the present nonzero peacetime risk of unauthorized launch. > Unfortunately for you, anyone with knows enough on this topic to > have an informed opinion can't say a word about it. I disagree. It seems to me the technological facts are not too difficult to perceive, without knowledge of exactly what the operations are. And, we are informed that PALs don't exist on subs. > How do you propose to communicate this PAL signal to the sub? > If you think it will surface once a day to get it, think again. Can't the sub. float a just-submerged antenna, for ULF and regular radio? Communications do exist now, don't they? > Besides, how do you know there is/[isn't] a 24 hour delay The information I have is that it would take a sub. 15-30 minutes to launch, and that as a matter of *physical capability* a launch in such a time frame takes no external enabling code. (Congressional testimony.) I assume that *purely procedural* requirements impose some sort of delay -- unless an affirmative launch order is received. Imposing a day-to-day day-or-two-long time-lapse PAL need not inhibit such a launch order, by the way, although because I think that deterrence is the subs. only sane function, the 24 hour wait should be imposed in all circumstances. > I'm sure the subs would do ANYTHING as revealing as floating an > antenna. Their defense is their low (invisible) profile. So what do they do for communications? Isn't ULF good enough? Is ELF on the way? And how detectable in the vast expanse is an antenna? I'm not convinced yet that this raises a big risk of detection. A little risk, I would think, maybe very little. > Besides, if Commander Jack T. Ripper (remember him??) decided to > go off his rocker, all he has to do is NOT raise the antenna, or Jack T. Ripper needs his crew to execute launch, and his direct subordinate is even now permitted to refuse a launch order without it being counted as insubordination. Two more crew members are needed to complete the launch order issuance procedure, which the launch crews are bound to obey. But, in the event of a missed signal, which would be broadcast to all the crew, Captain Jack T. Ripper could not prevent the crew knowing that the reason for the missed signal was mechanical failure. And even if the machanical persisted, we'd merely end up in the situation we are now in all the time. The crew would be aware of the damage -- after missing the first refresh signal, there would still be many hours before the PAL would lapse, in which, of course, the mechanics would be investigated. > I admit your solution fixes the problems I saw. There are encryption > methods I am told are very hard to break, and you could create a new > code every time a sub went out [A bit of a pain if one end misrecords > its copy of the random number used to generate the encryption]. I > wonder if the PAL codes on tactical warheads varies from warhead to > warhead? I don't know. > Even with LF communications, the sub must still come near > the surface to trail a long antenna. > There is one insurmountable problem. The refreshment signal, if > it were complex at all, could not be transmitted by ELF, due to its low > data rate. What this means is that the sub would have to approach peri- > scope depth, perhaps making it considerably more vulnerable to detection I'm not convinced that a periodic 6-hour refreshment signal would be impossible to manage or require a give-away surfacing. And the rule could be, that the PALs lapse only after 4 or 5 consecutive failures-to-receive, the attempts being initiated at the sub's discretion, not necessarily in an immediate series of attempts. > Has there been some development in communication with submerged subs > that I am unaware of? Who is up-to-date on this? > Assume an Evil Power launches a nuclear strike without > warning, or even that the US wishes to launch a first strike. The > entire submarine-launched missile force would be either useless for 24 > hours, or anyone who was listening to those broadcasts would know that > we were planning something. The PALs need not reduce first strike capability if there were also an affirmative code for releasing them (which I would oppose on the ground that first strike is nuts). As for second strike, I would sure hope we already have at least 24-hour procedurally required (albeit not physically enforced) wait period for confirmation of attack. > Um, what communication system do you propose to use to send this signal? > It should preferably have high bandwidth -- so it can transmit a fairly > complex authentication code in a few minutes -- and be able to reach a > deeply-submerged submarine quite reliably. I don't think the second requirement is essential, if my idea of having the PAL laspe after 4 or 5 failures-to-receive is the method employed, each reception attempt being initiated by the sub, not necessarily in immediate succession. To: MILITARY@ATT.ATT.COM