Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!att!cbnews!military From: wb8foz@mthvax.cs.miami.edu (David Lesher) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Battlefield communications Message-ID: <1990Jun6.170431.13722@cbnews.att.com> Date: 6 Jun 90 17:04:31 GMT Sender: military@cbnews.att.com (William B. Thacker) Distribution: na Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories Lines: 28 Approved: military@att.att.com From: David Lesher >We'll I don't think that it matters too very much if the enemy hears your >tatical communications back in his homeland. Most probably by the time he >can get a message back to his manuver units things will have changed. It is >much more important that you have good communications (again at the tatical >level) with only moderate security (20 min to break the code is probably more >than enough). There is whole class of work called SIGINT. It is devoted to extracting data from the presence of encrypted transmissions, as opposed to decrypting them. For example, the Germans could tell the size of an upcoming B-17 raid by how many command sets were being tuned up that afternoon. Another attack is the unclas headers: You say the traffic from Eisenhower's headquarters just tripled? What does THAT mean?..... See the Bodyguard of Lies, or any other book on Fortitude. -- A host is a host from coast to coast.....wb8foz@mthvax.cs.miami.edu & no one will talk to a host that's close............(305) 255-RTFM Unless the host (that isn't close)......................pob 570-335 is busy, hung or dead....................................33257-0335