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From: martin@oahu.cs.ucla.edu (david l. martin)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: Hayes vs. Searle
Message-ID: <36194@shemp.CS.UCLA.EDU>
Date: 12 Jun 90 23:56:05 GMT
References: <586@dlogics.COM> <IaPsbKG00VsUM0s0h_@andrew.cmu.edu> <13871@venera.isi.edu>
Sender: news@CS.UCLA.EDU
Organization: UCLA Computer Science Department
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In article <13871@venera.isi.edu> smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) writes:
>
>Leaving the issue of understanding aside for a moment, I think Searle is having
>a similar problem of misunderstanding with regard to computational behavior.
>The bottom line of Church's thesis is that symbol manipulation serves to
>EXPLAIN computational behavior, just as a theory based on the nature of
>atoms and molecules serves to explain solidity.  Thus, just as Wittgenstein
>has warned us against letting the specifics of the atomic model interfere with
>our understanding of solidity, so we should be careful about letting the
>specifics of symbol manipulation be confused with the behavior which they
>model.  In a previous article I accused Searle of being rather naive about
>what computers actually do in practice;  now I am inclined to believe he is
>just as naive about the general theory of computational behavior.
>

Although I'm certainly in sympathy with the desire to bring Wittgenstein
into the discussion, I don't find this comparison to be quite "solid";
at any rate, it could use a little fleshing out.

In the case of the atomic model of solidity, we all have some sort of notion
(depending on how much physics we had) of just how it manages to explain
solidity.  I mean, it really does succeed in being an explanation.  In the
case of the use of symbol manipulation, it _doesn't_ explain the things
that we'd like to have explained (things like "intelligence" and 
"understanding"), and isn't that just what Searle's point is?

Dave Martin