Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!cs.utexas.edu!yale!cs.yale.edu!blenko-tom From: blenko-tom@CS.YALE.EDU (Tom Blenko) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: No more Chinese rooms, please? Message-ID: <25465@cs.yale.edu> Date: 27 Jun 90 19:07:52 GMT References: <25445@cs.yale.edu> <1990Jun26.140923.22895@cs.umn.edu> <25457@cs.yale.edu> <4490@milton.u.washington.edu> Sender: news@cs.yale.edu Reply-To: blenko-tom@CS.YALE.EDU (Tom Blenko) Organization: Yale University Computer Science Dept, New Haven CT 06520-2158 Lines: 30 In article <4490@milton.u.washington.edu> forbis@milton.u.washington.edu (Gary Forbis) writes: |It does not make sense to say a city has been replicated then say it |has not. If an observer can tell the difference between the real and |the artificial then as far as this city goes it has failed the Turing |Test. If the architects are concerned with making the replica indestinguish- |able from the real then if civic pride is important it must be replicated. A city has extentional properties (resources it consumes, products it produces) and intentional properties (I suggest civic pride as an example). The analogy is made to the mind. Searle says input/output relations do not suffice to reproduce the mind because they capture extentional properties while neglecting intentional properties (of which hunger might be an example). And he takes hoping, fearing, loving, hungering, and so forth, which are not objectively observable, to be essential and intentional states of any mind. |>Searle takes consciousness |>and emotional states to be properties of the mind. His claim (indeed |>his solution to the mind-body problem) is that these intentional |>properties are identically the states of the underlying processor... | |Is Searle really a functionalist? I don't understand how he could be |and still dispute the claims of Strong AI. I don't know what you mean by "functionalist". Certainly he is a physicalist. And (one of) his arguments against strong AI is that intentional properties arise not just from the program but from the processor, as I've outlined previously. Tom