Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!cs.utexas.edu!yale!cs.yale.edu!blenko-tom
From: blenko-tom@CS.YALE.EDU (Tom Blenko)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: No more Chinese rooms, please?
Message-ID: <25497@cs.yale.edu>
Date: 2 Jul 90 18:36:27 GMT
References: <25422@cs.yale.edu> <593@ntpdvp1.UUCP> <965@idunno.Princeton.EDU> <36453@shemp.CS.UCLA.EDU> <2551@aipna.ed.ac.uk> <31329@cup.portal.com>
Sender: news@cs.yale.edu
Reply-To: blenko-tom@CS.YALE.EDU (Tom Blenko)
Organization: Yale University Computer Science Dept, New Haven CT  06520-2158
Lines: 58

In article <31329@cup.portal.com> Victoria_Beth_Berdon@cup.portal.com writes:
|(Note: this article is being posted for Ken Presting)
|...
|> In article <593@ntpdvp1.UUCP> kenp@ntpdvp1.UUCP (Ken Presting) writes:
|> |precise.  Searle is trying to prove the following:
|> |
|> |       For any program P whatsoever, and for any machine M whatsoever,
|> |       the following inference is always invalid:
|> |
|> |       Machine M runs Program P, therefore Machine M understands.
|>
|> In article <25422@cs.yale.edu>, blenko-tom@CS.YALE.EDU (Tom Blenko) writes:> 
|> This is much too strong, and you are arguing against yourself...
|
|Why do you think this is too strong, or that I'm arguing against myself?
|

It reads as

	FORALL P FORALL M  NOT(M(P) ==> M understands)

which says that no program running on any machine  results in a machine
that "understands" (should be system that understands).  Searle's claim
is closer to saying there is no universal intelligent program, i.e.,

	NOT(EXISTS P FORALL M  M(P) ==> M(P) is intelligent)

which is logically equivalent to the much weaker (than yours) assertion

	FORALL P EXISTS M  NOT(M(P) ==> M(P) is intelligent)

I say that you are arguing against yourself because you attribute this
claim to Searle (and the informal one it is intended to capture, saying
that Searle denies the "relevance" of programs), yet it is at odds with
your acknowledgement that Searle is not arguing against the possibility
of an intelligent, artificial entity.

|> I believe he makes the claim about biological versus silicon
|> implementations in his first paper, and I've certainly heard him make
|> that claim in person.
|
|On p.27 of the Sci. Am. article, Searle says:
|
|        Second, I have not tried to show that only biologically
|        based systems like our brains can think.  Right now, those 
|        are the only systems that we know for a fact can think, but we
|        might find other systems in the univers that can produce 
|        conscious thoughts, and we might even be able to create 
|        thinking systems artificially.
|
|I think this is a clear statement.

My point was that Searle believes not only the program, but the
implementing processor, contribute essential properties to the
resulting entity. Therefore it is relevant whether the implementing
processor/system consists of hardware, software, or wetware.

	Tom