Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!samsung!sdd.hp.com!ucsd!rutgers!rochester!cornell!oravax!daryl From: daryl@oravax.UUCP (Steven Daryl McCullough) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: No more Chinese rooms, please? Summary: filler filler filler Message-ID: <1583@oravax.UUCP> Date: 3 Jul 90 13:37:54 GMT References: <25422@cs.yale.edu> <593@ntpdvp1.UUCP> <31329@cup.portal.com> Organization: Odyssey Research Associates, Ithaca NY Lines: 35 In article <593@ntpdvp1.UUCP> kenp@ntpdvp1.UUCP (Ken Presting) writes: > Searle is trying to prove the following: > > For any program P whatsoever, and for any machine M whatsoever, > the following inference is always invalid: > > Machine M runs Program P, therefore Machine M understands. > If Searle were only trying to show that the inference above is invalid, then I would have no further argument with him; he would be correct. Furthermore, his Chinese Room argument would indeed be a convincing argument: If Machine M is the man in the Chinese room, then for any program P, the man could run program P and still not understand Chinese. However, the validity of the above inference is not claimed by Strong AI (or if it is, then they are just speaking loosely). The more precise claim would be that, for the right program P, one can infer Machine M runs Program P, therefore the system (Machine M running Program P) understands. This is closer to the strong AI position, and it seems that Searle has no good argument against it. For the Chinese room to count as an argument against this claim, it would be necessary to establish that the system (man + rules + room) does not understand Chinese. And Searle cannot establish this without offering *some* definition of what it means for a system to understand. (Comment: Searle's variant of having the man memorize the rules does not change anything; there would still be two systems: the man "acting himself" and the man following the rules. Establishing that one system does not understand does not automatically establish that the other doesn't.) Daryl McCullough