Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!samsung!umich!terminator!dabo.ifs.umich.edu!rees From: rees@dabo.ifs.umich.edu (Jim Rees) Newsgroups: comp.sys.apollo Subject: RE: security problems Message-ID: <1990Jun28.144947.13139@terminator.cc.umich.edu> Date: 28 Jun 90 14:49:47 GMT References: <9006281331.AA07122@richter.mit.edu> Sender: usenet@terminator.cc.umich.edu (usenet news) Reply-To: rees@citi.umich.edu (Jim Rees) Organization: University of Michigan IFS Project Lines: 31 In article <9006281331.AA07122@richter.mit.edu>, krowitz%richter@UMIX.CC.UMICH.EDU (David Krowitz) writes: Actually I have heard very little about the Cryptbreaker workbench. Can someone elaborate on this? I may be confused, but I thought that CBW was intended for breaking the crypt command, not the crypt call. The crypt command uses a one-rotor enigma and has never been considered cryptologically secure, at least not since the Nazis used it (enigma, not unix) in WWII. The crypt call uses DES, and as far as I know, DES is still considered secure in the sense that the only known practical attack is brute-force. U.S. law prohibits the export of encryption "devices," including software, without a license, so unix systems intended for export usually have the crypt command removed. Interestingly enough, if you cripple DES such that it becomes one-way only, it is no longer considered an encryption device and may be freely exported. So you have the bizarre situation that the high-tech, secure crypt(3) is OK but the low-tech, insecure crypt(1) is restricted. I don't see much that an average system administrator can do about Unix password encryption since the *&^%!!! system puts the ^%%HASD&^%%%!!! passwords in a file which *MUST* be publicly readable ... it's things like this that make me *HATE* Unix. I think the rationale is that you shouldn't depend on hiding passwords for security, and that making the password file world readable forces you to use a secure encryption method instead. I agree that this is a pain and should be changed.