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From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Ship survivability (USS Midway)
Message-ID: <1990Jun28.025925.19472@cbnews.att.com>
Date: 28 Jun 90 02:59:25 GMT
References: <1990Jun27.021023.1370@cbnews.att.com>
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From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold)
>From several articles about Midway fire:

> In brief, all four carriers succumbed to uncontrollable fires after
> being hit by typically three or four bombs from dive bombers.
> ...
> 
> By contrast, the USS Yorktown was hit by three (or four?  Rats!  I left
> the book at home.) bombs, including one down the funnel, and was ready
> ...
> In reference to the recent explosion/fire on the USS Midway, 
> terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) writes:
>> Basically there are fire and explosions on
>> navy ships on a regular basis (no they don't happen everyday, but
>> there are several a year).
> 
> ... rather that it (reportedly) took 10-12 hours to put it out.  And
> apparently the fire was in a storage area, not an ammunition or fuel
> compartment.  This sounds a lot more like Hiryu's experience than like
> Yorktown's.  Was the delay in putting out the fire the result of bad
> luck?  Or peacetime careless practices?  Or is there a fundamental
> problem?  Or have the facts been reported incorrectly?  I realize it
> may take some time to know for sure, but I would be glad if people
> kept these questions in mind and let us all know what they find out.

General comments about fires on Navy ships:

1. At the end of WWII, the USN had developed (of necessity) a combination
of ship design principles (compartmentation, reserve buoyancy), operating
practices (readiness conditions) and damage control doctrine which was 
certainly effective and practical.  All of these have been relaxed since,
and are not stringently applied to "modern" ships (which will never suffer
damage because we have high-tech defenses, or will simply get nuked).

2. One wartime practice was to remove anything that would burn. This 
meant removing paint, deck tile, curtains, wood, and most of the stuff
that make ships more habitable.  In peacetime, there is usually a LOT
of combustible material around; paint and deck coverings are big
contributors to shipboard fires.

3. Since the end of the draft, the Navy has had problems getting people
to stay in seagoing engineering ratings.  These include the DCs who 
maintain the damage control equipment, run the training, and are the key
people in the repair parties.

4. The DCO/DCA job on a ship was never a particularly attractive or high
prestige position leading to quick promotion.  Usually high turnover job
for some JO on his/her way to EO or 1st LT.

5. The emphasis on fire fighting training seems to have declined; not as
many people are sent, not as many firefighting schools (no direct observation
of this for several years, though).

A quick related sea story: I was on a ship that had a "mad fire lighter" for
a period of about 6 months. This guy would light off a trash fire in the
middle of the night while underway - leading to some intense moments.  
It definitely changed the attitude of the roving engineering watch and the
BMOW toward looking in every compartment and sniffing the air. I seem
to remember about 6 fires with no major damage or injuries.  Nothing like
GQ at 0230 to get the blood pumping. He was finally caught and sent to a 
USMC day-care center.

Pat Kauffold AT&T Bell Labs, Naperville (708) 713-4726