Path: utzoo!utgpu!watserv1!watmath!att!dptg!ulysses!andante!mit-eddie!uw-beaver!cornell!oravax!daryl
From: daryl@oravax.UUCP (Steven Daryl McCullough)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: Searle and biology
Summary: Searle gives the benefit of the doubt to "biological implementations", but not to silicon ones.
Message-ID: <1595@oravax.UUCP>
Date: 16 Jul 90 13:38:54 GMT
References: <14265@enera.isi.edu> <602@ntpdvp1.UUCP>
Organization: Odyssey Research Associates, Ithaca NY
Lines: 38

In article <602@ntpdvp1.UUCP>, kenp@ntpdvp1.UUCP (Ken Presting) writes:

> It is this: We know for a fact that brains think.  We don't know at
> all whether anything else will ever think.  Nobody in his right mind
> would deny the first assertion.  That is the extent of the
> "superiority of biological implementations."

Let me temporarily leave my right mind behind so that I can argue this
point. I would hesitate to say that "we know for a fact that brains
think" until we agree on what counts for knowledge in something like
this. The Strong AI proposal (which may or may not have been in
Turing's mind when he proposed his Turing Test) is that we know that
somebody or something is intelligent through observation of
his/her/its behavior. If this is a legitimate criterion for knowledge
of intelligence, then we do indeed know that brains think (and nothing
else, so far).

However, Searle denies the validity of using behavior as a test for
intelligence. What else is there? Well, introspection: I know that I
think because I experience myself thinking. This introspection doesn't
get me any closer to knowing that *brains* (plural) think; only that
*I* think.

The only way that I can see to come to the conclusion that brains
think is to apply the behaviorist criterion to other people, using
oneself as a standard. Searle's prejudice towards "biological
implementations" is evidenced by the fact that he is willing to accept
a much weaker notion of proof of intelligence for humans than for
computers.

(Note: An argument that has been made on Searle's behalf is that
intentional properties, such as the existence of mental states, are
important for determining whether an entity is intelligent. However,
Searle hasn't spelled out these properties, nor has he established
that human brains enjoy them, so they cannot be considered the
determining factor for Searle's conclusion that human beings think.)

Daryl McCullough